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 Abstract 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) changed the national discussion about who is the decision-
maker in healthcare delivery – physicians or others that pay the bill. The federal government is 
the largest payer of healthcare services while states are responsible for implementing the ACA’s 
features. Through the ACA, the federal government endorsed non-physician primary care by 
advanced practice registered nurses (APRN). The research question of this study is: Why do 
some primary care physicians support independent autonomous practice for advanced practice 
registered nurses while others do not? The research question should be important to policy-
makers because physicians are the predominate purchasers of healthcare services. However, 
dilemmas facing policy-makers as they adopt and implement the ACA are rapidly increasing 
public costs and demands for healthcare services that cannot be met by physicians alone. This 
study investigates ideology and PCP support for the ACA as influences on PCP opinions about 
APRNs. A web survey was offered to 2995 physicians practicing adult primary care in five 
states. Dichotomous groups were established from responses to the study’s independent 
variables. Group mean responses computed from questions relating to physicians’ opinions about 
APRNs were compared using the independent means t test. Results of bivariate testing find that 
ideology, support of the ACA, and whether physicians work with APRNs may influence 
physician opinions. Demographic characteristics including age, gender, and race are not related 
to physicians’ opinions about APRNs.  
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Chapter One - Introduction 
The research question for this study is: “Why do some primary care physicians support 
independent autonomous practice for advanced practice registered nurses while others do not?” 
The aim of the study is to determine if relationships exist that suggest influences on physician 
opinions about a specific policy related to health reform, independent autonomous (IA) practice 
for advanced practice registered nurses (APRN). Influences on physician opinions may originate 
from a range of sources including institutional influences from legislation and its adoption, other 
actors in the legislative and care delivery system, and the internalized beliefs of the physician 
(Kingdon, 2011; Ostrom, 1990; Sabatier, 1986; Schlager, 1995). The study looks at two possible 
influences on physicians’ opinions that may underpin their decision to support IA APRNs or not: 
1) their ideology and, 2) their support for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(P. L. 111-148, as amended) or Affordable Care Act (ACA) as it is popularly known.  
Collective choice theory is the primary frame of reference for the study’s research 
question (Ostrom, 1990). The unit of analysis in this study is the individual physician. Individual 
physicians are members of one or more groups of peers who share membership in a collective 
based primarily on their status to practice medicine. A collective is a group of individuals who 
share benefits of membership through the collective and are motivated through membership to 
behave in specific ways (Olson, 1965, p. 33). Members of the collective are “jointly affected” by 
actions based on a common set of objectives and/or incentives from the collective (Ostrom, 
1990, p. 38). In this study, the physician collective is licensed physicians who practice medicine 
as primary care physicians (PCP).  
Members of the physician collective are appropriators of collective goods, common pool 
resources, who then through their role provide them to eligible members of a community through 
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a principal-agent relationship (Ostrom, 2005, p. 27; Bohren, 1998, p. 748). In this study, the 
collective good is reimbursement. Reimbursement is available to the physician collective 
because physicians are licensed to provide medical services and thus are eligible to receive 
reimbursement for rendering those services. Reimbursement is allocated to physicians based on 
the eligibility of their patients to receive medical services through a legislated entitlement and/or 
an explicit contract such as a health insurance policy (Stafford and Yale, 2013). It is important to 
note that reimbursement is allocated to physicians and not negotiated. Arrangements by 
physicians to receive reimbursement is through a contract with a payer to perform certain types 
of services for a fixed fee per service which is also known as fee-for-service (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.).  
Ostrom (1990, p.52) refers to the rules associated with membership in a collective as 
“collective choice rules.” Collective choice rules define how day-to-day decisions/behaviors or 
operational choices are expected to be carried out by members of the collective and are often 
related to collective goods, the common pool resource (CPR) (Ostrom, 1990). Collective choice 
is defined as decisions and/or actions taken by an individual in a situation that are “governed” by 
the rules, norms, incentives, and/or penalties of the collective (Ostrom, 1990, p. 140-141). 
Collective choice theory is a theory of how individuals use rules to “make choices among 
alternatives” (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 2005, p 33). The conceptual frameworks Institutional 
Analysis Development (IAD) (Ostrom, 2005; Polski and Ostrom, 1999) and Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1988; Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers, 2008) in conjunction with 
collective choice theory are used to help understand the possible relationships between the study 
variables in the health policy action arena (Schlager, 1995). In care delivery, the health policy 
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arena is the physician-patient encounter (Ostrom, 1990). Health policy identifies the behavioral 
scope for physician stakeholders in the physician-patient encounter (Ostrom, 2005).  
Context of the Investigation 
The physician opinions of interest in this study are those that are associated with 
physician support for public policy about APRNs. Physician opinions about APRNs determine 
the circumstances under which physicians will support the policy or not (Ostrom, 2011; Weible, 
Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012). Physician support for APRNs’ IA practice is important for 
successful implementation of APRN policy because physician leadership is needed to transition 
the policy arena from the status quo to the reformed care delivery system (Angood and Birk, 
2014).  
Why physicians’ opinions matter in the development of health reform policy may not be 
completely obvious to policy makers. Physicians are perhaps the most important collective of 
health policy stakeholders because they not only control which health care services are 
purchased, but they also direct the consumption of services and products by their patients 
(Enthoven and Singer, 1999). There are suggestions that physician opinions may not have been 
adequately addressed to assure successful policy adoption under the Affordable Care Act 
(Deloitte, 2015a). During development of the ACA, many considerations were offered regarding 
potential policy responses to rising chronic disease prevalence, an aging population, and the 
efficacy of traditional fee-for-service reimbursement as a continuing business model (Angood 
and Birk, 2014). 
A Rand Corporation study on healthcare financing, completed prior to federal health 
reform in 2010, urged physicians to engage in “new” business practices. Rand advocated an 
expansion of the capabilities of the primary care system, in part to meet services demand that is 
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expected to grow throughout the current decade and in part to slow the growth of related costs 
(Eibner, Hussey, Ridgely, and McGlynn, 2009, p. 6). In a brief to lawmakers, the National 
Council of State Legislatures also recommended the implementation of care delivery models 
where physicians share patient responsibilities with different types of care providers through 
centralized delivery systems (National Council of State Legislatures, 2011). The Bi-partisan 
Policy Center made policy recommendations to change the reimbursement and payment models 
for physicians and also supported care delivery in the primary care system by non-physicians 
(Daschle, Domenici, Frist, and Rivlin, 2013). While seemingly targeted at the physician 
collective, many of the ACA policy development recommendations were actually “policy 
preferences” from interest groups not associated with direct clinical care (Arnold, 1990, p. 13; 
Gruber, 2011b, p. 4-5). 
Recommendations to supplement the physician workforce, use new business models, and 
change reimbursement strategies for physicians were incorporated in the ACA (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2013). However, individual physicians have been reluctant to wholeheartedly 
support changes to their scope-of-practice and accept any associated economic risks through a 
shift from the status quo fee-for-service (FFS) business model to new payment and business 
models specified in the ACA (Deloitte, 2015a; Merritt Hawkins, 2014). It appears to some 
investigators that physicians are not fully engaged by policy-makers to support specific health 
policy adoption and may choose individual self-interest over public interest in response to 
insufficient engagement (Angood and Birk, 2014; Isaacs and Jellinek, 2012; Lipsitz, 2012; 
Ostrom, 2005). Individual self-interests are those interests that promote the values held by an 
individual and in making decisions the individual chooses alternatives “… only in light of their 
beliefs …” that tend to benefit themselves (Ostrom, 2005, p. 33).  
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So, what influences physicians’ opinions about engaging in self-interest behaviors over 
“benefits” to a common good? After all, patients and policy-makers intuitively believe that health 
policy is supposed to represent the common needs and best interests of the public (Bodenheimer 
and Grumbach, 2012; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014). The present study investigates two possible 
influences on physician opinions about backing health policy for independent autonomous (IA) 
practice by advanced practice nurses (APRN). The study’s dependent variable is PCP opinions 
about APRNs. One of the independent variables and one of the two key concepts in the study is 
ideology. Ideology is measured on a polar scale from liberal to conservative for each respondent 
and relates to the PCP’s core beliefs as an influence on their opinions (Sabatier, 1988). Ideology 
as a core belief may influence physician opinions about supporting changes to the status quo or 
not, even in the face of objective evidence to the contrary (Edelman and Crandall, 2012; 
Sabatier, 1988). In the current study a change in the status quo is the support of IA APRNs.  
Another independent variable in the current study and the second key concept is support 
for ACA reform legislation. Support for health reform through the ACA is measured in terms of 
PCPs who support the ACA and PCPs who do not support the ACA. Federal health reform from 
the ACA may influence physician opinions about changes in the status quo because of its “top-
down” rather than collaborative approach to changing physician practice patterns, reimbursement 
and payment amounts, and services that are eligible for reimbursement; topics that are important 
to the self-interests of physicians (Bhuyan, Jorgensen, and Sharma, 2010; Friedberg, Chen, 
White, Jung, Raaen, Hirshman, Hock, Stevens, Ginsburg, Casalino, Tutty, Vargo, and Lipinski, 
2015; Sabatier, 1986).  
The influences of ideology and legislated reform may be essential in forming physicians’ 
support for policy adoption that benefit the common good over physician self-interests (Gruen, 
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Campbell, and Blumenthal, 2006). Through an understanding of the strength of influence from 
ideology and support for reform, health policy makers may be able to more effectively 
implement legislation that better meets the needs of their states. In addition, policy-makers might 
be able to more efficiently engage physicians to compromise in support of changes to the care 
delivery status quo that reduces program costs and increases access to services.  
Characterization of Health Policy and Physician Collective Choice 
Health policy is most frequently focused on issues surrounding the costs of care delivery 
which operationally is related to the way physicians practice medicine, physician incomes, and 
government budget outflows (Jost, 2012; National Council of State Legislatures, 2011; Patel and 
Rushefsky, 2014). Current health policy is largely intended to moderate patient-care consumption 
and physician collective choice behaviors about what services are necessary in any given care 
situation (National Council of State Legislatures, 2011; World Health Organization, 2010). 
Physician collective choice in the care delivery policy arena refers to the range of preferences 
from which an individual physician chooses when making a decision to select one treatment over 
another through a comparison between “… status quo rules and an altered set of rules” (Olson, 
1965; Ostrom, 1990, p. 142, Ostrom, 2005, p. 45). The economic consequences from patient 
consumption and physician collective choice begin with physician-patient encounters and are 
subject to legal authority granted exclusively to physicians by a multitude of federal, state, and 
local legislation (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2005).  
Legislatures and their endorsed medical governance institutions, including state medical 
boards and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) among others, attempt to 
shape physician collective choice about what is necessary and reasonable care. These 
institutional actions are deemed proper in order to regulate economic and political outcomes 
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from physician decisions and patient behaviors that require reimbursement from public funds 
(Boufford and Lee, 2001). The clinical decisions made by physicians enable patient and payer 
spending actions through reimbursement for the services provided at the point-of-care. State and 
Federal reimbursement for health services is a cost to government payers, typically with little 
offsetting revenue, and is projected by nearly every authority to continue growing in double 
digits at least through the next decade (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Patel and Rushefsky, 
2014; PWC Health Research Institute, 2014).  
Patient-care decisions about which clinical treatments to employ are collective choice 
decisions historically influenced by the status quo of clinical experience and peer-based best 
practices (Ostrom, 2005; Robertson, Rose, and Keselheim, 2012). However, care decisions are 
increasingly being made based on policy mandates that may or may not be related to clinical 
evidence, but are driven instead by cost and price controls related to treatments and specific 
services (Angood and Birk, 2014; Friedberg, Chen, White, Jung, Raaen, Hirshman, Hock, 
Stevens, Ginsburg, Casalino, Tutty, Vargo, and Lipinski, 2015). In the case of policy that 
purports to be based on clinical evidence, physician collective choice still may not support 
prevailing policy, especially if the policy mandates the way physicians are expected practice 
medicine (Friedberg et. al., 2015). Without physician support of policy at the point-of-care, it is 
difficult to achieve the desired policy cost containment outcomes when physicians do not engage 
in the execution of the policy because in the end, patient-care decisions are their exclusive 
purview (Friedberg et. al., 2015). 
Symbolizing the Healthcare Market 
Healthcare in the U.S. is a modern anachronism or a paradox through its symbolic 
persona. The traditional healthcare market’s persona has developed historically through patient-
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centered care, which is doing what is best for the patient and not being overly concerned with the 
economics of care delivery (Agnew, 1890; Jacox, 2009). In the early days of medicine before 
legislated demand for standards of services and formalized reimbursement, as in today’s market, 
healthcare was primarily provided by the women of a community who did what they could for 
the sick and injured. The last resort in the community was to ask for help from the one educated 
or apprenticed person referred to as “doc” the country doctor (Agnew, 1890; Randolf, 2009; 
Wall, 1998).  
Reimbursement for services rendered by the care provider was given by the patient or 
their family and judged fair based on gratitude for the effort that produced the type of outcome 
expected by both parties. In the 1900’s endearing community concepts such as “the country 
doctor” gave way to a more formal care delivery business model where physicians were paid a 
set fee for the specific services they provided to the patient. Led by collective-based 
organizations, such as the American Medical Association and the Philadelphia Almshouse, these 
organizations’ mission was to guide and/or shape the economic, professional, and political 
ideology of physicians (Agnew, 1890; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2009; Warrington, 1839). Through the advocacy of these and other policy 
entrepreneurs the national dialog about “public” medical care was forever changed and care 
delivery became formalized with physician decision-making related to reimbursement as “… the 
driving force in the healthcare system” (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Wolinsky and Brune, 
1994, p.44). 
Today, third parties reimburse care providers on behalf of patients and operate as both 
patient and physician advocates to define the consumption relationships amongst all stakeholders 
in the healthcare market (Friedberg, et. al., 2015; PWC Health Research Institute, 2014). The 
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third-party payers, insurance companies, employers, and state and Federal government, allocate 
reimbursement resources annually based on population health projections (Ehrenreich and 
Ehrenreich 1971; PWC Health Research Institute, 2014; Wildavsky, 1977). The third party 
payers govern the equity of care delivery and economic exchanges to physicians on behalf of the 
sick and injured based on the specific amounts and services the third party chooses to reimburse 
in regulated patient-care delivery models (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Wolinsky and 
Brune, 1994).  
In the US, healthcare as an industry contributes 17.7% to America’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and that gets the attention of policy-makers and policy advocates for a number of 
reasons (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2013; Deloitte, 2015a; U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2014). Healthcare GDP includes wages through employment in care delivery markets and 
related organizations, state and federal taxes from patient care consumption of regulated and 
non-regulated health-related products and services, and manufactured and financial capital 
generated throughout the medical-industrial complex (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Ostrom, 
2010; Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). In other 
words, nearly every citizen, law-maker, and all sorts of other advocates have a vested interest in 
how the makeup of care delivery policy will impact their interests, often irrespective of relevant 
clinical decisions. 
Federal law provides the authority for regulation and implementation of healthcare 
delivery to states, principally through the 10th Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution (O’Brien, 2008). The governing relationship between patients and providers is 
established by state medical boards staffed primarily by members of the physician collective. 
Twenty states have separate medical boards for medical doctors and osteopathic doctors, both of 
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which are fully qualified physicians (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012). These seventy 
groups of independent authority define how healthcare services are provided and by whom those 
services can be provided within state jurisdictions through medical scope-of-practice laws 
(Federation of State Medical Boards, 2005, 2012). Each state jurisdiction independently 
establishes legal practice authority in healthcare, but is influenced by “… state legislators, 
medical boards, medical societies, and others who have an interest in regulation of the medical 
profession …” (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012, p.3).  
Overlaying the interests of state regulators and bringing another vested-interest to 
influence the type of care provided by medical professionals are hundreds of private and public 
“care adjudicators” (Green and Rowell, 2015). Care or claims adjudicators determine 
reimbursement amounts for care based on a claim that services were rendered. Care adjudicators 
work for payers and mediate payer financial obligations with physicians. Amounts available for 
reimbursement to physicians are typically determined through an annual budget cycle using 
population health projections that establish an acceptable medical loss ratio (MLR) (Green and 
Rowell, 2015; Haberkorn, 2010). The “acceptable” MLR for reimbursement is the ratio of 
available budgeted funds to the payments already provided from the budget (Haberkorn, 2010).  
The pool of funds in the budget is allocated to reimburse providers based on the projected 
health incidence for that year (Green and Rowell, 2015; Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim, 
2012). However, for care adjudicators, the interest is economic over compassionate concerns 
about health status (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Jacobson, Earle, and Newhouse, 2011; 
National Association of State Insurance Commissioners, 2014; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014). 
Adjudication criteria are based on a determination of what is “necessary and appropriate” care, 
which is “reasonably” defined and codified by the care adjudicators (Green and Rowell, 2015). 
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Care adjudicators are typically hired by health insurance companies, employers, public payers 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, and malpractice insurers (Green and Rowell, 2015; Lee, 2006; 
National Association of State Insurance Commissioners, 2014; Robertson, Rose, and 
Kesselheim, 2012).  
The economic interests of payers is a powerful influence on physicians’ opinions about 
the care delivery system especially that of government payers using public funds (Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission, 2014). Payers reimburse for care based on their economic 
analysis rather than treatment criteria per se (Green and Rowell, 2015). In addition to contractual 
arrangements the physician accepts to treat public insurance beneficiaries, government payers 
have the power of legislative authority through interpretation of policy to ensure physician 
compliance with this payer’s interests (Arnold, 1990; Green and Rowell, 2015). Private payers 
rely on contract relationships with physicians to assure compliance.  
Often, already heavily discounting their service rates and being second guessed about 
clinical decisions during claim adjudication, physicians may resist legislated reforms of their 
practice patterns which have the potential, real or perceived, to further change their practice 
revenue flows (Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012). It is important to understand that 
reimbursement is based on amounts the payer chooses, not the amount physicians’ bill for the 
services (Green and Rowell, 2015). This institutional arrangement is likely a disincentive for 
some physicians to support a wholesale change to the care delivery model (Ostrom, 2005). The 
exception to such discounting from provider billing is when the patient is the payer. Patient 
payers are obligated to pay the amounts demanded by the physician. With non-contracted billing, 
patient payers and providing out-of-network services, the physician has legal authority to collect 
whatever they bill or negotiate to collect (Green and Rowell, 2015).  
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The Healthcare Lobby as Physician Opinion Influencer 
According to the Center for Public Integrity, in 2010 there were one-thousand-seven-
hundred-fifty (1,750) registered lobby organizations employing four-thousand-five-hundred and 
twenty-five (4,525) lobbyists to influence health reform with federal policy-makers (Eaton and 
Pell, 2010, p. 1). The issues supported by healthcare lobbyists in 2010 were broad across the 
continuum of care, with some of the healthcare lobby interests either directly or indirectly 
advocating for or against opening up primary care scope-of-practice to non-physicians as a 
means of cost containment. However, nearly all of the groups lobbying for or against changes to 
scope of practice rules, including labor unions, manufacturers, small business, big business, and 
government among others, focused on economic issues and changes in the manner of the 
physician-patient interaction rather than clinical care issues (Eaton and Pell, 2010; Grubner, 
2011a). The policy positions of these groups were often in ideological conflict with the direct 
interests of physicians (Gruber, 2011b). Aligning themselves with ideologically diverse groups 
may be a disincentive for physicians to support reform because of group differences rather than 
the characteristics of reform itself (Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin, 2013; Ripberger, Song, Nowlin, 
Jones, Jenkins-Smith, 2012). The Affordable Care Act which was passed into national law in 
2010 during the Obama administration was possibly seen by many physicians as a challenge to 
their legally-granted clinical authority as well an intrusion by an ideologically liberal pro-reform 
government into physicians’ self-interests (Bonica, 2014; Deloitte, 2013). 
Healthcare advocates are mostly privately organized lobby groups, some structured as 
community grass-roots organizations and some extending their organization to include paid 
lobbyists (Eaton and Pell, 2010; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014). Vested interests in the healthcare 
system increasingly support issues related to driving economic and political agendas over “best 
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interest” patient-care decisions (American Association of Retired Persons, 2014; Bodenheimer 
and Grumbach, 2012; PWC Health Research Institute, 2014). For interests concerned about 
strictly healthcare spending around prices and costs for patient consumption interests, which 
includes the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the pharmaceutical industry, 
and health insurance companies among others, the policy preferences of lobbyists tend to be the 
minimization of the range of possible clinical decisions through standardized care guidelines 
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Enthoven, 1993; Gruber, 
2011b; Wolinsky and Brune, 1994; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014). Other advocate groups 
concerned with patient-centric care behaviors, including the American Cancer Society, AARP, 
The Alzheimer’s Association, the American Pharmaceutical Association, and labor unions, 
among others, rally around policy to increase patient-consumption in order to maximize care for 
the money spent (Enthoven, 1993; Gruber, 2011b). The range of advocacy issues, whether 
seeking to minimize or maximize patient consumption behaviors, illustrates an important 
paradox that exists today between clinical decisions and economic factors in healthcare policy. 
That paradox is the reality that health policy relates to the perspective of who is paying for 
services and not physicians’ clinical decisions (Stone, 1977).  
The balance between clinical efficacy and cost is defined by third-party payers of care, 
reinforced through health policy, and implemented by states through licensed providers of care. 
The balance of responsibility to patients in this somewhat convoluted payer-provider relationship 
establishes the perspective that physicians are at arm’s length from cost containment decisions 
and reinforces the persistent denial in the medical community that care delivery is not a profit-
driven business (Angood and Birk, 2014; French, Gilkey, and Earp, 2009; Stone, 1997). Care 
delivery in the US is dependent upon two conflicting activities: 1) clinical decision-making and 
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2) the self-interests of individual physicians in generating medical practice revenue and profit 
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012, Gruber, 2011b; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014; Robertson, 
Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012). It is this incongruence that health policy attempts to clarify by 
exposing the economic relationships of clinical decision-making through a focus on cost 
containment (Angood and Birk, 2014; Isaacs and Jellinek 2012; Stone, 1997). 
The Rights and Responsibilities of Care Delivery 
The historically persistent physician collective and lobby group is the American Medical 
Association (AMA) which was established in 1847. The AMA spent at least $20 million 
lobbying on behalf of physician interests in the year before passage of the ACA (Bonica, 2014; 
Eaton and Pell, 2010). The AMA is a federation of physician collective affiliates in each state 
with centralized governance that sets its agenda around issues it deems important (Ehrenreich 
and Ehrenreich, 1971; Olson, 1965; Wolinsky and Brune, 1994). From its inception, the AMA 
served to preserve the economic interests of physicians and the sanctity of clinical medical 
decision-making only by physicians (Wolinsky and Brune, 1994). Later through its endorsement 
of Blue Cross Blue Shield Organizations, the AMA legitimized the business and economic 
relationships of care delivery (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Wolinsky and Brune, 1994). 
Insurance and other third party payers keep the economics of care delivery at an arm’s length 
from clinical decision-making, but never-the-less which clinical services are reimbursed is a 
vested physician interest (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1971).  
In the early 1920’s organized groups around issues related to patients’ rights and 
professional responsibilities grew in number. A contrast in ideologies came to a head in 1920-
1921 through a dialog that would recur to present time. Liberals supported healthcare as a patient 
right. Conservatives supported healthcare as a commodity (Lemons, 1969). Lemons (1969) noted 
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widespread industry and physician opposition to care delivery reform and public health insurance 
as seen by concerted attacks on the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921, an attempt to establish 
national health insurance. Collectives of physicians, organized as state medical societies and 
under the influence of AMA thought leaders, portrayed federal health insurance proposals and 
healthcare reform as an “… imported socialist scheme” even though this act was supported by 
notable conservatives of the time including President Harding (Lemons, 1969, p. 781-782). 
Organized physicians’ opposition was based on a desire to maintain the status quo of medical 
practice while increasing physician conformity to AMA values, including the preservation of 
their mutual free-market self-interests (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Lemons, 1969; 
Whyte, 1998).  
The commoditization of healthcare was essentially cemented in the late 1920’s. Private 
health insurance was formalized at Baylor University and supported by the AMA. The Baylor 
insurance program is the forerunner of what today is known as Blue Cross Blue Shield 
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Reed, 1965; Wolinsky and Brune, 1994). From that time in 
history until the passage of Medicare in 1965, physicians as the key stakeholders in healthcare 
were fairly autonomous from restrictive government regulation (Lemons, 1969).  
With the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1964-1965, the status quo of care delivery 
became based on the volume of services provided by physicians and government-assured 
reimbursements (Colombotos, 1969). Healthcare costs then began escalating out of control 
primarily due to care delivery based on status quo fee-for-service reimbursement (Office of the 
President, 2013). State implementations of national health policies began to compete with other 
social programs for funding and resulted in budget challenges for most states (Office of the 
President, 2013). From the 1970’s to present, the demand for services began to grow beyond the 
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ability of the physician establishment to adequately provide access to care delivery services 
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Green, Savin, and Lu, 2013; Gruber, 2011a; Patel and 
Rushefsky, 2014). Rising costs, increasing patient demand, not enough physicians to provide 
care, and the implementation requirements of the ACA created a need for states to seek care 
delivery solutions outside of the traditional care delivery models (Green, Savin, and Lu 2013 
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013a).  
Care Delivery by Non-Physicians for Cost Containment 
State governments have at their disposal at least one solution to control and reduce high 
healthcare costs in primary care settings while increasing access to services for their constituents 
under the ACA. The solution involves permitting independent autonomous (IA) primary care 
practice by advanced practice registered nurses (APRN) (Hill, Wilkinson, and Holahan, 2014; 
Hoyt and Proehl, 2012, p. 287). IA licensure of APRNs increases the number of primary care 
providers in a jurisdiction and provides care services that “… maximize the capacity of the 
healthcare system …” for previously underserved patients and their need for services access 
(Link, Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014, p. 128).  
At the end of 2014, there were nineteen (19) states and the District of Columbia that had 
legislated full independent autonomous (IA) scope of practice authority for nurse practitioners 
including many of the rights and privileges historically empowered to physicians (American 
Association of Nurse Practioners, 2014, Minnesota Nurse Practitioners Association, 2014; Yee, 
Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). This suggests that in the states that permit IA APRNs, there 
was some support by primary care physicians for changing state scope-of-practice laws for 
APRNs. Physicians in general offer positive opinions about APRNs as clinicians, but they have 
not widely endorsed APRNs for IA scope of practice in primary care settings (Acquilino, 
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Damiano, Willard, Momany, and Levy, 1999; Street and Cossman, 2010; Donelan, DesRoches, 
Dittus, and Buerhaus, 2013). Physicians, particularly PCPs, work closely with APRNs in the care 
delivery system and are likely to be in the best position to evaluate and endorse IA APRNs as 
clinicians (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012). Physician opinions about IA APRNs seem 
inconsistent with the facts about APRN practice given relatively homogenous healthcare needs in 
the US. Opinions about permitting APRNs to practice independently vary among physicians and 
are often aligned with State Medical Scope of Practice Acts which may support the self-interests 
and ideology of physicians more than the interests of patients and the community served by IA 
APRNs (Safrit, 2011).  
Physicians that choose not to adapt to the dynamics of community healthcare reform with 
increased access and lower costs are more likely to exit the business of medicine or move their 
practice of medicine to business models other than private practice (Physicians Foundation, 
2010). Under Federal legislation from the ACA, physician and APRN independent practice 
together is projected to meet the growing demand for services and provide greater patient access 
to more primary care services in their communities (Mathews and Brown, 2013; Oliver, 
Pennington, and Reville, 2015). These joint practice characteristics in the reformed healthcare 
market beg the question of why do some primary care physicians support IA APRNs while others 
do not. 
APRNs practicing IA primary care is a change in the care delivery system promoted by 
national health reform legislation from the ACA, but left to states to adopt or not. Physicians are 
slow to adapt to reform of the care system under the ACA. The ACA specifies reform through a 
focus on cost containment and changes to the structure of the care delivery system including 
adding new business models and provider types (Connors and Gostin, 2010, p. 5; Hoyt and 
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Proehl, 2012). Physicians in primary care have been made aware through advocacy groups that 
the provisions of the ACA may benefit other stakeholders, including APRNs, over PCPs (Porter 
and Lee, 2013). Physicians are also aware that by continuing to practice under the status quo fee-
for-service reimbursement model, their incomes will be reduced through cost controls and 
payment reform while simultaneously experiencing reductions in their clinical decision-making 
authority (American Medical Association, 2010; Lathrop and Hodnicki, 2014; Mathews and 
Brown, 2013). The ACA is politically divisive legislation with Americans nearly evenly divided 
over the ideological issues associated with the details of reform under the act (Doherty and 
Tyson, 2014). Physicians, like the public in general, may have developed negative opinions 
about the legislated ACA reforms for reasons other than empirical facts related to certain social 
benefits. On this basis, some physicians remain steadfast in their opposition to the inevitable 
changes in the way healthcare is practiced in the US (Merritt Hawkins, 2014). 
In the reformed primary care system, APRNs are poised through education, skill and 
demonstrated competence to be more than physician extenders as they are often characterized by 
the physician community (American Medical Association, 2009; Lathrop and Hodnicki, 2014). 
APRNs at the level of their education can provide the same types of care and services in the 
primary care delivery system as physicians with the same quality outcomes at a lower cost (Link, 
Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014; Mathews and Brown, 2013). Despite the legislated reform from the 
ACA and demonstrated value from APRN practice, physicians who could gain economically and 
politically through an equal partnership with APRNs have not widely endorsed independent 
autonomous practice by APRNs (Gilman and Koslov, 2014; Naylor and Kurtzman, 2010). State 
policymakers whose budgets are being strained to deficit by rising healthcare costs are 
increasingly not waiting for physicians to support the independent autonomous primary care 
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practice of nurse practitioners and are legislating changes to state scope-of-practice laws over the 
concerns of their states’ physician collectives (Merritt Hawkins, 2014; National Conference of 
State Legislatures, 2013). In states that have changed scope-of-practice laws to favor APRN IA 
practice, the results of those policy implementations are generally positive through increased 
access and lower costs (Conover and Richards, 2015; Oliver, Pennington, and Reville, 2015).  
Study Purpose 
The research question for this study is “Why do some primary care physicians support 
independent autonomous practice for advanced practice registered nurses while others do not?” 
The purpose of this study is to assess if ideology and PCP support for the ACA are associated 
with why some physicians support policy for IA APRNs and some do not. The study also 
characterizes the relationship of respondent’s age, gender, years in practice since residency, how 
often they work with APRNs, and their role in their affiliated care delivery organization to 
physician opinions about APRNs.  
Policy-makers may discover the study findings useful in constructing state health policy 
about APRN practice that is meaningful to PCPs in their jurisdictions. The study findings may 
also assist policy makers in promoting social change to PCPs in ways that encourage 
compromise in reform of primary care delivery models that are required by federal legislation. 
Insights into correlates of physician opinion may additionally enhance consumer understanding 
of APRN policy’s benefits and risks while increasing the likelihood of receiving endorsement for 
APRN policy from elected legislators.  
IA APRN practice may be attractive to state budget authorities and legislators in 
controlling costs and improving access to services (Cassidy, 2012; Institute of Medicine, 2011; 
Gilman and Koslov, 2014; Liu, Finkelstein, and Poghosyan, 2014; National Conference of State 
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Legislatures, 2013; Wiysonge and Chopra, 2008). Through a better understanding of the 
influences on PCP’s opinions about IA APRNs, policy makers can make informed decisions 
about the policy context for IA APRNs while soliciting professional support from physicians of 
all practice types for the implementation of policy related to IA APRNs’ scope of practice 
authority. The assumption underlying this study is that if it is possible to measure the influences 
on physicians’ opinions about APRN policy, then it is likely that successful policy 
implementation can be predicted in some circumstances. If this assumption is plausible, then 
policy-makers can use this knowledge during policy development and possibly better serve the 
interests of physicians, patients, and other stakeholders. 
Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 
This study is bringing together previously independent insights, motivations, and/or 
influences from other studies on PCP opinions about APRNs (Acquilino, Damiano, Willard, 
Momany, and Levy, 1999; Dimock, Doherty, Kiley, and Krishnamurthy, 2014; Donelan, 
DesRoches, Dittus, and Buerhaus, 2013; Huntoon, K., McCluney, C., Scannell, C., Wiley, E., 
Bruno, R., Andrews, A, & Gorman, P., 2011; Jackson Health Care, 2012; Street and Cossman, 
2010). The opinions of PCPs as health policy stakeholders are important to policy makers when 
considering changes to APRN scope-of-practice laws. PCPs represent a key sub-population of 
physicians who professionally associate with APRNs in ways that may be different from other 
physician specialists (Link, Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014). PCP leadership is needed to re-frame the 
delivery system around the requirements of health reform in ways that successfully re-define 
physician self-interest in line with change that maximizes all stakeholder interests as much as 
possible. 
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The current study is unique for four reasons compared to other studies that have looked at 
physician opinions about APRNs. First, the study population includes only PCPs rather than 
including other specialists with possibly different APRN practice experiences. Secondly, the 
PCPs in the study practice adult primary care, which is the patient population with the highest 
expected rate of growth through 2030 (United Healthcare Center for Health Reform & 
Modernization, 2014). Third, physician ideology has not been considered as a primary influence 
on opinions about APRNs, but has been shown to be a socio-political determinant for who does 
what in healthcare (Jacox, 2009). And, fourth, the study assesses whether PCPs’ support of the 
ACA is related to their opinions about APRNs. 
The study research question considers the lack of accord between physician support of IA 
APRNs and empirical evidence of its social benefit. In the face of this discordance, the study 
considers the possibility that ideology and support for the ACA are factors of influence on PCP 
opinions about IA APRNs. There is a great deal of evidence supporting the practicality of APRN 
practice as one part of the solution to address the inability of the traditional physician-led 
primary care system to control costs and expand access to care. Very little empirical evidence to 
the contrary exists outside of that produced through the physician lobby to suggest that IA 
APRNs would not meet these unmet social needs. Given the strength of evidence toward the 
likely success of APRN as primary care providers it seems reasonable to speculate that intrinsic 
factors may be holding sway over physicians’ opinions about IA APRNs. In other studies, 
ideology and support for the ACA have been shown independently to influence physician 
opinions (Goldman, 1974; Beaussier, 2012; Bonica, Rosenthal, and Rothman, 2014). This study 
looked at both factors in the same research panel to better understand their relationship to 
physicians’ opinions. 
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Summary of the Chapter 
Healthcare cost and access challenges set in motion the possibility of greater reliance on 
non-physicians in primary care. The ACA suggests that states should change their scope-of-
practice laws to permit IA APRN practice in primary care. Still, some physicians do not support 
IA APRNs in light of evidence that suggests APRN care is a prudent solution to issues of cost 
and access. The present study was undertaken to determine the association between ideology and 
support of the ACA on physicians’ opinions about APRNs. 
Chapter one presented the study’s perspective of the health policy arena which is rooted 
in the delivery of primary care services under health reform, generally in terms of preventative 
services and chronic disease maintenance. As a point of reference, the historical status quo 
perspective of primary care delivery is acute care with fee-for-service reimbursement while 
reform legislation calls for services that are integrated toward wellness with payments based on 
health outcomes. Chapter two is a review of the academic and professional literature about 
public policy, APRNs, issues of health reform, ideology, and collective action based on the 
current state of knowledge. Chapter two includes an examination of the healthcare market’s 
value proposition about care delivery related to APRNs. The APRN value proposition is included 
in order to establish an empirical foundation about the reasonableness of supporting APRNs for 
IA practice in primary care. Chapter three describes the research methodology employed in the 
present study. Chapter four presents the study results. Chapter five offers an interpretation of the 
study results from the perspective of successful healthcare reform. Chapter five also provides a 
description of the study’s contribution to the state of knowledge and offers suggestions for 
extending the current study in future research. 
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Chapter Two – Literature Review and Theoretical Orientation 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the paradigms used to establish the perspective for answering the 
study’s research question; “Why do some primary care physicians support independent 
autonomous practice for advanced practice registered nurses while others do not?” The study’s 
review of literature is divided into five sections. First, the value of APRNs in the healthcare 
market is considered to assure that IA APRNs are a reasonable policy response to meet ACA 
policy objectives. The APRN value proposition is reviewed from the perspective of 
implementing APRN policy and changing state scope-of-practice laws. Second, collective choice 
theory as portrayed by Ostrom (1990) is examined as a rational theoretical foundation to guide 
the study and its research design. Third, the structure and significance of policy arenas (Ostrom, 
1990, 2007; Sabatier, 1988) is reviewed to explore how exogenous influences in the physician-
patient policy arena might interact with ideology and support for the ACA to influence physician 
opinions. The fourth section of literature reviews physicians’ support for the Affordable Care Act 
or not in terms of how physician behavior is manifest from their opinions about health reform 
from inception to the present. Finally, literature about ideology as a generalized motivating 
influence on physician behavior related to health reform is reviewed. 
The IA APRN Value Proposition 
The clinical contribution of APRNs in the care delivery policy arena is important to 
establishing the value of their IA practice to relevant stakeholders. Independent autonomous (IA) 
practice is also referred to as full practice authority. “Full practice authority is the collection of 
state practice and licensure laws that allow for nurse practitioners to evaluate patients, diagnose, 
order and interpret diagnostic tests, initiate and manage treatments—including prescribe 
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medications—under the exclusive licensure authority of the state board of nursing” without 
physician oversight (American Association of Nurse Practitioners, 2013, p. 1). IA APRN 
practice in primary care needs to elicit continuing confidence from the public, policy-makers, 
and their primary care peers. In addition, as states consider scope-of-practice changes, APRN 
value should also demonstrate how those contributions “fit” into the framework of the ACA as 
meaningful elements of federally legislated health reform. Federal health reform legislation is 
adopted and implemented by state jurisdictions according to their unique needs. It should be 
significant to policy-makers that the National Conference of State Legislators has a vested 
interest in health reform adoption and advocates that the absence of a state’s legislative 
acceptance of IA APRNs is a missed opportunity to better control rising budgets and to bring 
primary care services to underserved constituent populations (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2013).  
Physicians in opposition to IA APRNs generally express concerns in concert with 
narratives from the AMA that if APRNs are allowed to practice IA primary care, they will not 
have the skills to identify complications at the point-of-care and patients may die or be 
irreparably be harmed (American Medical Association, 2009; Donelan, DesRoches, Dittus, and 
Buerhaus, 2013). The services provided by APRNs in primary care are often more 
comprehensive than similar primary care services delivered by physicians or other non-physician 
providers due largely to the scope of their professional training (Cassidy, 2012; Wiysonge and 
Chopra, 2008). APRNs are able to provide the same or greater quality outcomes as physicians, 
but without the depth of diagnostic skills that might be determined by physicians as necessary 
during acute care assessment (American Medical Association, 2009; Cassidy, 2012; Institute of 
Medicine, 2011). However in similar ways as PCPs refer complex patients to specialist 
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physicians through the recognition of needs outside of their expertise, APRNs are trained to 
make the same type of referrals both to PCPs and specialists (Cassidy, 2012; Conover and 
Richards, 2015).  
Primary care delivered by APRNs has been shown to be cost effective in terms of 
providing direct care of common acute care presentments such as generalized malaise, minor to 
moderate injuries, and most chronic disease maintenance activities (American Association of 
Nurse Practitioners, 2013). Primary care by APRNs is also appropriate for delivering 
preventative services and managing indirect care by monitoring patient self-management 
(Institute of Medicine, 2011). APRNs as primary care providers generate high levels of patient 
satisfaction and increase access to care services both in highly served and underserved 
populations (Cassidy, 2012; Conover and Richards, 2015; Liu, Finkelstein, and Poghosyan, 
2014; Tillett, 2011).  
Oliver, Pennington, and Revelle (2014) specifically assessed the outcomes from 
independent autonomous practice by APRNs throughout the U.S. Their study compared existing 
state scope-of-practice criteria for APRNs from restrictive to full-practice authority. They found 
that in states enforcing reduced or restricted APRN practice authority compared to IA APRNs 
there is an associated lower quality of health status. “States that allow independent APRN 
practice have a healthier population than states that do not” often with better outcomes than their 
physician counterparts and at least with similar outcomes (Oliver, Pennington, and Revelle, 
2014, p. 4). The Oliver, Pennington, and Revelle (2014) study suggests that common objections 
(American Medical Association, 2009) about outcomes and quality from APRN care delivery are 
not supported through empirical evidence (Conover and Richards, 2015).  
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In a related follow-up study, Oliver, Pennington, Revelle, and Rantz (2014) assessed 
spending by state and federal jurisdictions on Medicare and Medicaid and found that IA APRN 
practice in primary care settings is related to lower rates of expenditures accomplished in part 
through effective long-term care from primary care: fewer hospitalizations and lower hospital re-
admission rates. Positive findings about clinical outcomes by APRNs suggest that denying 
APRNs full practice authority in local jurisdictions, especially those with access deficiencies, 
low health status, and negative budget impact from healthcare spending may be a missed 
opportunity for state legislators to better serve their constituencies (Conover and Richards, 2015; 
Gilman and Koslov, 2014). The study states are representative of states with low overall health 
status and are deficient in providing primary care services to their constituencies (United 
Healthcare Foundation, 2014). National rankings of health status identify Arkansas (overall 49th), 
Mississippi (overall 50th), Oklahoma (overall 46th), Louisiana (overall 48th), and Alabama 
(overall 43rd) in the lowest positions of those rankings (United Healthcare Foundation, 2014). 
None of the study states permit IA practice in primary care by APRNs. 
Federal healthcare systems including the Veterans Administration, Community Health 
Centers, Indian Health Service, and the US Military permit independent autonomous practice by 
APRNs as a means to expand their respective clinician pool and provide greater access to care 
services (Morgan, Abbott, McNeil, and Fisher, 2012; US Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2013). Medicare permits APRNs to bill for services they provide irrespective of their 
autonomous status (Yee, Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). However, in states that do not allow 
independent autonomous practice for APRNs the fees received from Medicare reimbursement 
for APRN service are typically paid to the medical practice that employs the APRN which 
increases the cost of the services provided through the practice’s cost of doing business (Gilman 
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and Koslov, 2014). According to the National Institute for Health Care Reform, physician 
control of APRN practice through employment relationships determines which patients will be 
cared for, and determines which services APRNs will provide (Institute of Medicine, 2011; Yee, 
Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). 
Donelan, DesRoches, Dittus, and Buerhaus (2013) surveyed 972 physician and nurse 
practitioner clinicians about their respective roles in the primary care delivery system. Each 
group of clinicians, physicians and APRNs, were generally in opposition with their counterparts 
when responding to questions about whether physicians or APRNs deliver the highest quality of 
care, whether physicians and APRNs should receive equal pay for equal work, and whether 
increasing the number of primary care providers would have a positive effect on the cost of care 
(Donelan, DesRoches, Dittus, and Buerhaus, 2013, p. 1905). The contrast in opinions between 
APRNs and physicians assessed by Donelan, DesRoches, Dittus, and Buerhaus (2013, p. 1905) 
suggested that positively influencing physicians’ opinions is an important consideration for 
gaining IA scope-of-practice status for APRNs in primary care.  
Street and Cossman (2010) surveyed 563 practicing physicians in Mississippi to 
determine their attitudes about APRNs among those physicians who work directly with APRNs. 
Their conclusion was that “Familiarity does not yet generate enough attitudinal support to 
persuade Mississippi physicians that NPs should be permitted to practice independently …” 
(Street and Cossman, 2010, p. 437). The authors found that while physicians who work directly 
with APRNs generally have positive opinions about APRNs and regard their work with patients 
as positive, as a group, physicians in Mississippi choose not to support full practice authority of 
APRNs (Street and Cossman, 2010, p. 433). The majority of the Street and Cossman (2010) 
study respondents preferred APRNs to practice only under the authority of a physician. Physician 
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practice authority is a characteristic of the traditional care system where physicians are the sole 
decision-makers and resource appropriators (Reinhardt, 1977; 30 Million New Patients, 2013). 
The Street and Cossman study sample of physicians self-identified more heavily as specialists 
(59%) rather than PCPs who most often work with APRNs and may as a group have a different 
perspective about APRNs (Street and Cossman, 2010, p. 434-435). PCPs are the physician 
specialists who are most likely to benefit economically and professionally from a care delivery 
system that includes IA APRNs (Matthews and Brown, 2013). 
Street and Cossman’s study (2010) used a rating scale containing statements about APRN 
practices and consequences; the scale was originally developed and validated by Acquilino, 
Damiano, Willard, Momany, and Levy (1999). The same index and question set measuring 
physicians’ opinions about APRNs was used in this study as the dependent variable. The 
Acquilino et al. study surveyed 259 self-identified primary care physicians in non-institutional 
practices to provide a measure of their attitudes about APRNs delivering primary care in Iowa 
(1999, p. 224). Both the Street and Cossman study and the Acquilino et al studies computed a 
composite score across twelve (12) questions that reflect physicians’ attitudes toward APRNs. 
Both studies found that when physicians work with APRNs, the physicians have a positive 
opinion about APRNs as professionals and the care they provide, yet those physician decision-
makers in their respective states did not support the independent autonomous practice of APRNs 
(Acquilino et al., 1999; Street and Cossman, 2010).  
At the time of both studies, there was a large and growing body of literature documenting 
that APRNs are as competent as physicians in providing primary care, are more cost effective 
than physicians providing the same level of care, and produce at least the same quality of care 
outcomes as physicians (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1986; US Department 
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of Health and Human Services, 2002; American Association of Retired Persons, 2010; Yee, 
Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). Organized physician groups such as the AMA and the 
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) among others continue to lobby against IA 
APRNs and present counter views to the value of APRNs as IA primary care providers 
(American Academy of Family Physicians, 2013, 2015; American Medical Association, 2009). 
Theory of Collective Choice  
This study looks to collective choice theory articulated by Ostrom (1990) for guidance in 
better understanding the dynamics of opinions and decisions made by physicians about 
supporting independent autonomous practice by nurse practitioners. Collective choice theory is a 
theory about how individuals as members of a group make choices between actions and 
behaviors that result in outcomes that either benefit themselves, self-interest, or the larger public 
interest (Ostrom, 1990). Collective choice theory considers the influences on individuals from 
peers, institutions, the environment, and other factors when faced with a choice situation. In 
collective choice theory, individuals who are faced with choices are members of a group defined 
as a collective. Choices faced by the collective are typically associated with a resource or 
resources that are of interest to the collective (Ostrom, 1990).  
A collective is a group of individuals who share a homogeneous and mutually understood 
identity that “… transforms individual experiences into collective experience” Mosimane, Breen, 
and Nkhata, 2012, p. 347). The members of a collective have shared interests around a 
resource(s) and through those interests common experiences and expectations about the 
collective are shared through a “collective identity” (Mosimane, Breen, and Nkhata, 2012, p. 
350; Ostrom, 1990). In this study, the collective is licensed physicians who practice medicine as 
primary care physicians (PCP). Individuals in the PCP/physician collective assume the role of 
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“appropriator” of collective goods also known as a common pool resource (CPR) (Ostrom, 1990, 
p. 30-31). The common pool resource of interest to physician appropriators in this study is 
reimbursement. 
Another key concept in collective choice theory is that of the common pool resource 
(Ostrom, 1990; Seabright, 1993). The CPR is a finite and subtractable asset which is the focus of 
appropriator actions and behaviors, observable in an action arena (Ostrom, 1990, p.32; Walker, 
Gardner, & Ostrom, 1989). In this study the common pool resource is reimbursement. 
Reimbursement is payment to care providers from payers for services rendered to patients. 
Reimbursement, whether from private or public payers, is finite and subtractable, two primary 
properties of a CPR (Ostrom, 1990). The Reimbursement CPR is a budgeted entity, meaning it is 
finite based on the projected allocation by the payer to make it available to appropriators (Rubin, 
2010). Reimbursement is also subtractable meaning that once a unit of reimbursement is 
consumed that unit is no longer available for appropriation and the total amount of budgeted 
reimbursement is reduced by the amount of that unit (Rubin, 2010)1. Appropriation of 
reimbursement is available uniquely to PCPs because of their membership in the physician 
collective. Members of the PCP collective are entitled to appropriate reimbursement from private 
and public payers for the services they provide to eligible patient beneficiaries (Ball, 1997).  
Patient beneficiaries or “resource users” are members of a community which is a subset 
of individual patients in the general population (Ostrom, 2005, p.15). Patient beneficiaries are 
eligible and have rights to receive benefits associated with the CPR, reimbursement, through a 
                                                 
1 Conceptually subtractability of reimbursement fits the definition posited by Ostrom (1990, p. 
32). However by law public payers must make up any shortfalls from the budget and pay all 
legitimate claims for reimbursement. For private payers, the shortfall situation is similar. State 
regulators require private payers to maintain reserves as a proportion of their annual 
reimbursement budgets to makeup budget shortfalls.  
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legislated entitlement and/or an explicit contract such as a health insurance policy (Stafford and 
Yale, 2013). The CPR is a private and/or public good in healthcare delivery, depending on the 
payer. The CPR brings the physician collective together with patient beneficiaries in an 
action/policy arena where appropriation activities occur (Ostrom, 2005).  
Eligibility for membership in a collective is based on a specific exclusive right such as 
licensure. Membership promotes shared beneficial outcomes through the “interdependence” of 
appropriation activities among members of the collective including income earning opportunities 
not attainable by non-members (Olson, 1965, p. 6; Ostrom, 1990, p. 38). However, there are 
bounded constraints on behavior that are associated with being a member in the collective such 
as behaving ethically according to the specifics of licensure regulations, managing the 
consumption of resources for the common good, and attaining periodic recertification of 
licensure, among others (Olson, 1965; Wade, 1987; Ostrom, 1990). An example of a bounded 
constraint through membership in the PCP collective is the right only by licensure to treat 
patients and receive reimbursement for those treatment services. Licensure to practice medicine 
is granted by state medical boards and is open only to properly credentialed individuals 
(Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012). There are substantial legal penalties for non-
members of the physician collective who attempt to practice medicine in a medical commons.  
The concept of a commons is a broad term that is a generic reference to a community 
and/or collective with certain rights related to resources (McGinnis, 2011). A commons can 
represent the rights to many different types of resources such as fishing rights, oil and other 
natural resources, or Medicare and private health insurance reimbursement benefits in the 
medical commons (Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 2005). For instance, Medicare benefits which are rights 
to seek medical services, are available only to a subset of US citizens who are entitled to receive 
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those benefits under law (Ball, 1997). Like Medicare benefits, private health insurance benefits 
are another type of rights in the medical commons. Insurance policy members/owners are the 
only individuals eligible to receive the specific choices of services, funding, and access to 
services offered under common benefits associated with an insurance policy.  
Members of the physician collective use the CPR as a means to provide benefit to patient 
members of the medical commons. Members of the physician collective have a formal affiliation 
with the commons through some type(s) of preferred relationship which is typically a contract 
that makes them eligible to treat specific patients (Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, 
n.d.). Physicians are licensed by one or more state jurisdictions, a requirement for collective 
membership, and are individually certified to access reimbursement for beneficiaries in one or 
more specific patient commons (Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Reimbursements for medical 
services are limited by and subtractive from private and public financial budgets, patient access 
to the physician collective, and the types of services that are allocated to individual patients 
(Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 2005).  
PCPs appropriate reimbursement on behalf of their patients which may involve 
authorizing related collectives to receive reimbursement through the same or other commons 
such as Medicare Part A and Part B beneficiaries. Other types of collectives that have an interest 
in reimbursement based on physician collective decisions are hospitals, pharmacies, state and 
local government, and clinical laboratories among others who can also receive reimbursement 
through physician-patient interactions (Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 1990; Woolf and Stange, 2006). The 
collective of provider appropriators in each medical jurisdiction is authorized by state medical 
boards that can, with or without legislation, determine which clinician types under what 
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circumstances can participate in resource appropriation activities (Federation of State Medical 
Boards, 2012). 
The common pool resource of the medical commons, reimbursement, is established by 
annual government budgets for public medical spending and by private insurance companies 
which determine annual limits of reimbursement based on actuarial computations (Hunter, 
2008). It is fundamentally these constraints on reimbursement by government and private payer 
companies that are incentives or dis-incentives toward self-interest by clinician appropriators. 
Other interested stakeholders in the reimbursement CPR, hospitals and so forth, are motivated by 
their interest in the CPR to influence physician collective behaviors and/or opinions toward those 
interests such as toward the benefits of one drug over another or the quality of one hospital over 
another (Hunter, 2008; Ostrom, 1990). Physicians’ opinions about the legitimacy of the 
institutionally imposed constraints on their access to the CPR and the influences from other 
stakeholders shape physician appropriation behaviors toward how patients’ treatments are 
selected and the allocation of resources during treatment (Lipsitz, 2012; Robertson, Rose, and 
Kesselheim, 2012).  
Appropriation activities for reimbursement resources start at the point-of-care when 
provider decisions about patient needs are determined. At the point-of-care, the clinician is sole 
decision-maker typically only subject to institutional adjudication of those decisions (Scott and 
Vick, 1999). Physician appropriators’ access to resources from the common pool of 
reimbursement is based primarily on personal and collective self-governance of their decisions or 
operational rules (Ostrom, 2005). Appropriation decisions in the medical commons are also 
subject to national governance constraints surrounding the CPR which are termed constitutional 
rules and include constraints such as reimbursement payment limits or availability of the 
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resource for other reasons. Constitutional rules, which typically result from legislative policy, are 
translated into local, state and collective operational rules, and are implemented through state 
and local jurisdictions (Ostrom, 2005; Polski and Ostrom, 1999). Wennberg (1984, p1.) 
describes the impunity of physician clinical decision-making based on operational rules as the 
physician “practice style factor” which is tempered through the institutional governance that 
resulted in establishing the operational rules (Ostrom, 2005). Governance surrounding clinical 
decisions is achieved through rules that tend to constrain appropriation decisions and behaviors 
based on cost containment strategies in the policy arena (Ostrom, 1990; Robertson, Rose, and 
Kesselheim, 2012; Woolf and Stange, 2006). Working rules specify which services are available 
for reimbursement by the payer (Ostrom, 2005).  
Clinical decisions in the physician-patient policy arena are often specified through the 
physician collective’s “working rules” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 19-20). Working rules are often 
characterized as expected or normative behavior through condition of collective membership and 
enforced through procedures such as peer review (Federation of Medical Boards, 2012; Ostrom, 
2005). Working rules are also an integral part of each member’s self-interest. Working rules 
enable collective-choice decisions associated with reasonable and customary services to provide 
to a patient, order on behalf of the patient, and refer to other providers in the practice of medicine 
(Ostrom, 1990; Scott and Vick, 1999).  
Ostrom (2005) describes the choices members of the collective make during 
appropriation behaviors as being challenges to maintaining a balance between self-interest, 
interests of the collective, and interests of the commons. Searle (2001, p. 56-57, 124-126) when 
discussing the motivation of individuals to engage in rational collective actions, suggests that this 
balance of interests is “collective intentionality that enables institutional facts …” such as 
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meanings, status, beliefs, and desires, and in essence represents adherence to norms and 
expectations of individual behavior. It is precisely the physician’s impunity in making clinical 
decisions that is attractive to various types of stakeholders who want to influence the clinical 
decision-making process and maximize their own participation in the healthcare policy arena 
through association with the physician collective. 
Choice-behaviors made by member-appropriators of a collective tend to be based on 
decisions that are taken to maximize outcome utility relative to the member’s self-interest or in 
other words “…attaining something by means of this membership” (Olson, 1965, p. 6). Hardin 
(1969) posits that self-interest related choice-behaviors in the collective will eventually become 
the dominant motivation over interests beneficial to the collective and lead to the failure of the 
collective in what he describes as the “tragedy of the commons.” Hardin further suggests that 
there is no technical solution, that is to say formalized institutionalized incentives or constraints, 
which will intervene in the path to destruction of the collective from an over-riding self-interest 
(Hardin, 1968). Ostrom (1990, 2005) takes issue with failure of the collective as a fait accompli. 
Ostrom (2005, p. 62) suggests that institutional intervention in the form of rational governance 
will sustain the collective by regulating/socially constructing the meaning and/or value of self-
interest to be more consistent with interests of the collective and the commons.  
Under health reform, interests of the commons are defined as population health 
characteristics which through evidence-based medicine produce information to guide clinical 
decisions toward the interests of the commons (Berwick, Nolan, and Whittington, 2008; Berwick 
and Hackbarth, 2012). Choice behavior in the collective is increasingly influenced by 
information from the collective to guide members in decision-making situations relative to the 
context of a choice situation and to the benefit of the collective; such as information describing 
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behavioral constraints from reform legislation and which services are likely not to be 
reimbursable (McGinnis, 2013). Information, according to Wildavsky (1994), is itself a 
context-based social construction that is seldom complete, mutually shared, un-biased, and 
influences decision-making and appropriation behavior toward outcomes based on personal 
opinions and preferences that may be inconsistent with collective interests or interests of the 
commons. Self-interest inconsistencies with collective and/or common interests may also be the 
result of cultural bias influences that includes individual ideology and level of support for reform 
from the ACA (Ripberger, Song, Nowlin, Jones, and Jenkins-Smith, 2012).  
Decisions that are based on information available only in the primary care collective, 
such as institutional regulations regarding PCP reimbursement and appropriation adjudication 
among similar types of information, have come to be influenced as much by individual 
appropriator characteristics as by clinical evidence (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012). Increasingly, 
prior experiences, influences from opinion leaders, group think, the principal agent relationship, 
physician agency, and moral hazard among others, influence physician opinions and decisions. 
These influences, asymmetric to the physician decision-maker, often carry more weight than 
sources of relevant evidence-based information which seemingly should drive clinical decision-
making at the point-of-care (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; McGinnis, 2013; Scott and Vick, 
1999; Searle, 2001; Stone, 2011).  
Incomplete or asymmetric information often results in inefficient resource appropriation 
in choice situations; typically overutilization of resources that benefits the appropriators’ self-
interest (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012). The principal beneficiary of the choice outcome, the 
patient in the primary care commons, permits the appropriation as chosen by the PCP because 
they do not object to or are not aware of inconsistencies in the appropriation. Without objection 
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from the patient about the services they receive, the patient consents to the physicians’ decision 
and relies on their clinical expertise to make a proper decision that will benefit relevant 
stakeholders in the choice situation (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; Nair, Manchanda, and 
Bhatia, 2010; Scott, 2004; Scott and Vick, 1999). Some medical professionals suggest that it is 
the inefficient appropriation of commons resources through the traditional fee-for-service care 
delivery system that has necessitated the need for reform of the healthcare system (Berwick and 
Hackbarth, 2012).  
Healthcare reform from the ACA mandates new constitutional rules for a 
(re)prioritization, or rationing, of how commons resources are allocated through cost controls on 
services, payment caps, and reimbursement reductions (Ostrom, 2007). The ACA also specifies 
changes to operational rules in the physician-patient policy arena which are typically specified 
by the physician collective through state implantation of federal legislation (Ostrom, 1990). 
Under the ACA some operational rules are implemented through the constitutional level rather 
than through state implementation by authorizing of new types of delivery organizations, 
accountable care organizations and patient centered medical homes, which through the Act are 
authorized and eligible for special reimbursement (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; Cassel and 
Brennan, 2007; Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 2007, Woolf and Stange, 2006). 
Collective choice theory predicts that in times of needed rationing through a prioritization 
of resource appropriations, such as with healthcare spending controls in the current marketplace, 
resource appropriators will be influenced to maintain personal control over the most lucrative 
resources that minimize their costs and simultaneously maximize their self-interests over 
common interests (Ostrom, 2011). In the medical commons, lucrative resources could be 
characterized as appropriations from care delivery transactions that do not require the expertise 
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of a highly educated physician professional and are consciously withheld from appropriation by 
less expensive methods of appropriation, such as by IA APRNs (Hiatt, 1975). That sort of 
collective action by physicians, denial of non-physician access to the commons, serves to 
maintain the care delivery status quo (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; Robertson, Rose, and 
Kesselheim, 2012). Self-interest actions of this type can be observed in the physician-patient 
policy arena. 
The Physician-patient Policy Arena 
A policy arena is the context where the interaction effects of policy incentives and/or 
disincentives are observable. Interactions in the physician-patient policy arena are easily thought 
of as separate transactions, but in reality each one is often a set of interdependent economic 
transactions (Andersen, 1995). One or more of these interdependent transactions may 
simultaneously exert influence over treatment decisions that are made in the policy arena, such 
as with diagnostic testing (Ostrom, 2011). All transactions in the physician-patient policy arena 
originate from a physician-patient interaction which is the distinct starting point in the CPR 
appropriation process. The physician-patient policy arena is where clinical treatment decisions 
are made based on collective-choice rules and physicians’ preferences that are manifest through 
their clinical expertise. A broad array stakeholders thus have vested interests in influencing the 
outcomes of treatment choices made by the physician (Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers, 2008).  
In health policy arenas, the influences on physician opinions and decisions can come 
from a wide range of sources including personal beliefs, business interests, policy actors, 
individual citizens, and government (Kingdon, 2011; Weible, Heikkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 
2012). Policy actors are a special type of influence on collective action the policy arena. Policy 
actors are often characterized as policy specialists within a policy arena/subsystem and often 
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offer expert information as the basis of their credible influence (Weible, 2008). Policy specialists 
are typically specific to a policy subsystem and should not be confused with physician 
specialists. Policy actors/specialists may impact the beliefs and opinions of physicians and other 
stakeholders in ways that influence the way policy is implemented (Ingold, 2009; Sabatier, 1988; 
Weible, 2008). In health policy arenas, non-physician stakeholders often operate to influence 
physician behavior through advocacy narratives that possibly operate in concert with ideology to 
support the status quo or to vigorously pursue favorable implementation in support of their 
interests (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013; Stone, 1989). Many attempts to influence 
health policy implementation focus on care delivery transactions in the physician-patient policy 
arena.  
The physician-patient policy arena operates through a fundamental principal-agent 
relationship representing economic incentives directed by physicians (Laffont and Martimort, 
2001). The patient as principal is the recipient of the direct benefits of the transaction such as 
treatment and acquiesces to decisions and information from the physician-agent (Frees, Gao, and 
Rosenberg, 2011). The physician in their role of agent frequently makes all decisions about care 
including what services to purchase and how those services will be delivered. Frees, Gao, and 
Rosenberg (2011) used the publically available national Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) to assess the predictability of health care expenditures. They found that not only do 
patients acquiesce to their clinician about purchase decisions, but they also rely on the payer of 
care, insurance companies and government, to assure that services are available to support 
physician decisions (Frees, Gao, and Rosenberg, 2011).  
The relationship between payer and the type of care delivered certainly seems to favor the 
physician’s ability to make choice decisions within the framework of most favorable 
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reimbursement from both party’s perspectives. Mealem and Yaniv (2011) in a study of patient 
compliance with treatment regimens suggest that higher physician reimbursement for services 
has a tendency to increase the exchange of information between agent and principal which may 
result in better treatment outcomes. Conversely the model they applied found that physician 
empathy toward making pro-patient choices between eligible services fell as the rate of their 
reimbursement fees increased (Mealem and Yaniv, 2011, p. 10). This finding on physician 
empathy by Mealem and Yaniv (2011) suggests that economic self-interest is an important 
motivation for unilateral decision-making about care delivery in the physician-patient action 
arena. 
Nearly all care delivery transactions have related advocacy interests seeking to gain favor 
with physicians to minimize or maximize the reimbursement on behalf of the patient principal 
(Bandura, 2001; Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012). All care delivery transactions are 
related to physician agency as well as economic motivations. The significance of physician 
agency surrounding care delivery and reimbursement decisions is related to induced-demand; 
that is to say, the ability to make binding choices about care delivery with impunity (Bandura, 
2001; Jacobson, Chang, Newhouse, and Earle, 2013). Economic considerations are powerful 
motivations in the health policy arena. They are part of a reward structure for participating in the 
business of healthcare which is not only beneficial to physicians, but to other stakeholders 
downstream from the initial patient-physician transaction (Enthoven, 1998; Ostrom, 2010). 
Such systemic and exogenous influences on health policy and physician opinions is often 
obscured to the public and elected legislators’ by a lack of knowledge of how relationships 
between healthcare providers and others in the healthcare system operate and are permitted to 
interact by regulation (Weed and Weed, 1999; Lipsitz, 2012; McGinnis, 2013). Care delivery 
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relationships between patients and providers also create confusion about the characteristics of the 
healthcare system and relevant health policy (Gruen, Campbell, and Blumenthal, 2006). Patients 
tend to experience care delivery with narrowly focused objective criteria related to the perceived 
appropriateness of the physician-patient interaction (Andersen, 1995).  
Patients and the lay public in general tend to view physicians as agents always acting in 
the patient’s best interest (Scott and Vick, 1999). In reality, patients’ best interest may or may 
not be known to the patient. The principal-agent relationship in care delivery is generally how 
the lay public understands the workings of the healthcare market (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 
2012; Gruen, Campbell, and Blumenthal, 2006). There is a lack of understanding by the lay 
public about the significance and the scope of non-professional roles physicians assume that also 
impact their treatment decisions (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Gruen, Campbell, and 
Blumenthal, 2006; Scott and Vick, 1999). Patients want to see the compassionate side of care 
delivery from physicians as the only interest clinicians engage in on behalf of patients. They do 
not readily perceive physicians’ need to maximize profitability of the practice, to finance their 
retirement, and generally to engage in all sorts of economic related behaviors related to running a 
business (Scott and Vick, 1999). This selective understanding of physician behavior is frequently 
the result of asymmetric knowledge and information regarding what is appropriate during care 
delivery (McGinnis, 2013). 
Physicians can and do induce demand for their own services in part through their desire 
to please patients, such as over-testing to rule out all possible causes of malaise and in part to 
serve their own interests (Reinhardt, 1975; Stone, 2011). It is difficult for the lay-public to 
understand the risks and rewards of policy that may or may not influence physicians through the 
multitude of interpersonal and system interactions involved in care delivery (30 Million New 
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Patients, 2013). Without an understanding of the subtleties involved in the depth and breadth of 
care delivery, citizens are unlikely to assist legislators through their comment and advocacy in 
the development of meaningful health policy. Therefore in the policy arena it is often necessary 
for the public and most legislators to rely on subject-matter experts, policy actors, to interpret the 
complexities of legislation; such as the case with the ten titles in the 1,100 pages of 
specifications of the ACA intended to reform the traditional care delivery system (Bernier and 
Clavier, 2011; Forest, 2013; Mebane and Blendon, 2001). As a result of the passage of the ACA 
there appears to be a general lack of willingness by physicians to provide patients with non-
biased information about care delivery changes even as it impacts their treatments (Wilensky, 
2012; National Public Radio, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and Harvard T.H. Chan School 
of Public Health, 2015). 
Physicians’ biases through the dissemination of information in the physician-patient 
policy arena is experienced by both patients and non-physician rule-making authorities (Scott 
and Vick, 1999). Scott and Vick (1999) performed a discreet choice experiment with the public 
to determine patient care delivery experiences related to information exchange in the physician-
patient policy arena. In a principal-agent relationship such a physician-patient, the ideal situation 
is when the agent makes the same decisions an informed principal would make, given the same 
information. Scott and Vick (1999) noted that in the physician-patient policy arena, there is an 
absence of an explicit contract between principal and agent. The lack of an explicit contract puts 
the principal (patient) at a disadvantage when services are received because the experience is 
based on agent (physician) actions rather that predictable expectations known by both parties 
(Landwehr and Bohm, 2011; Scott and Vick, 1999).  
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The study by Scott and Vick (1999) found a relationship between the annual number of 
times a patient engages with a physician in care delivery and their involvement in decision-
making about care delivery based on the information presented by the physician. The greater the 
number of times the patient and physician interact, the more relevant information becomes and 
the greater the likelihood that the patient will become involved in decision-making (Scott and 
Vick, 1999, p. 127). Patient engagement in treatment decisions has been shown to improve 
quality outcomes (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2014).  
The Scott and Vick findings (1999, p. 113-114; 127) suggest that patients with less 
frequent interactions simply want to know “what is going on” rather than being engaged in care 
through the details of treatment or options – indicating a preference for information in the short 
term over knowledge and understanding. They also found that in cases where the care being 
provided is due to an acute episode of care, such as severe pain, patients are not inclined to seek 
much information at all about their care. Patients are inclined to simply accept the physician’s 
recommendations, including purchase, reimbursement, and patient out-of-pocket payment 
decisions (Scott and Vick, 1999, p. 128). The significance of the Scott and Vick (1999) research 
findings to the ACA is that under health reform the volume of physician-patient interactions are 
limited through cost containment measures and may possibly create a gap between the services a 
physician is willing to provide and actually engaging patients in their own care. 
Green, Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt (2009, p. 153) investigated a “gap between research 
and practice” related to health policy and physician behavior in care delivery. This gap is 
observed quite dramatically when physician decisions about standards of care are over-ruled by 
payers’ based on practice guidelines where cost and not the patient is the focus of care delivery. 
For example during reimbursement adjudication payers will often “audit” practice transactions 
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that appear, at least on paper, to be outside of allowed services. An example of this gap is the 
case where a physician prescribes daily monitoring of blood glucose levels and the payer 
specifies weekly monitoring as being adequate (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2013). Often, the physician disputes the adjudication decision without reimbursement for the 
time spent regardless of outcome. In the end such practice guidelines are frequently not used or 
recognized as valid by physicians in their decision-making process and the patient becomes the 
payer of those services (Green, Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt, 2009). Physicians sometimes 
establish “barriers to dissemination” with their patients by ignoring regulations they perceive to 
be narrowly focused or improperly validated by research and that do not mirror their individual 
practice style (Green, Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt, 2009, p. 153).  
Barriers to dissemination may also influence physician opinions about broad policy 
issues. The result may produce motivation for to take advantage of the situation and promote 
their own perspective to patients (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013; Stone, 1999). Such 
self-promotion that influences physician opinions about health policy may further bias the 
presentation of information to patients about treatment options in the policy arena (National 
Institutes of Health, 2014). Green, Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt (2009, p. 154) blame “tradition-
bound practitioners who insist on practicing their way …” for attempting to maintain the care 
delivery status quo. In their study conclusion, Green Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt (2009, p.166) 
state that “scientific” evidence resulting in health policy is meant to be “practice-based” from the 
patients’ perspective, reflecting the reality of individual patient and population needs rather than 
the self-interest of healthcare providers. In this sense “practice-based” is interpreted to be 
evidence-based medicine that integrates collective choice rules with physicians’ clinical 
expertise (Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, Richardson, 1996). Without such an objective 
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basis for decision-making at the point of care, it is likely that the self-interests of stakeholders 
will continue to be a hindrance in meeting reform policy goals. 
Influences on physician opinions about changing the status quo are challenges to 
overcome in the traditional care delivery system. Closing the gap between the reality of day-to-
day care delivery and the effectiveness of reform intended to mediate physician self-interest may 
not simply be a matter of new rule-making. The influences on physicians’ opinions about reform 
are broad-based and intertwined with an array of physician self-interests. A starting point for 
health reform adoption may be to positively shift physicians’ self-interest in support of reform. 
Physician Support of the Affordable Care Act 
The ACA was the first significant health reform legislation to challenge the care delivery 
status quo since the passage of Medicare legislation in 1965. The ACA changes the status quo of 
care delivery and physician behavior away from acute care toward preventative care. It includes 
endorsements for non-physician primary care delivery. The ACA mandates a greater role for IA 
APRNs as part of collaborative care models using capitation2 as the associated financial model in 
lieu of fee-for-service reimbursement (Angood and Birk, 2014; Connors and Gostin, 2010; 
Lathrop and Hodnicki, 2014). Reform of the primary care delivery model and access to primary 
care services through the chronic care management model is also legislated under the ACA. Four 
of the key goals of ACA care delivery reform are: 1) to increase the utilization of basic primary 
care services, 2) to include mechanisms for preventative services, 3) to deliver long-term chronic 
care management through primary care, previously in the purview of specialist physicians, and 
                                                 
2 Capitation is a form of pre-payment for services. Fixed payments are provided that encourage 
pro-active care in order to avoid the costs associated with acute care delivery. Physicians and/or 
their practices may also receive periodic bonus payments for sustaining low overall cost 
outlays. 
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4) to provide cost controls in the traditional care delivery status quo (Lathrop and Hodnicki, 
2014). These and other objectives from the ACA are dependent on an adequate supply of PCPs, 
or their equivalent, in the care delivery system (Yee, Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). 
Collaborative care and/or so-called “patient-centric” care delivery models are integral 
cost-saving components of health system reform under the ACA. There are two newly 
sanctioned delivery models, Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) and Patient Centered 
Medical Homes (PCMH), which specify care delivery with and without physicians as sole 
decision-makers (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012). Both of these new ACA delivery models 
rely on APRNs and other non-physicians to deliver and coordinate primary care services directly 
to patients (Angood and Birk, 2014; Auerbach, Chen, Friedberg, Reid, Lau, Buerhaus, and 
Mehrotra, 2013; Nielsen, Olayiwola, Grundy, and Grumbach, 2014). The transformation of the 
healthcare delivery system under reform requires the participation of physicians to provide 
professional and policy leadership and drive the operational change necessary to reform the 
traditional care delivery models (Angood and Birk, 2014; Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; 
Zismer, 2013).  
Studies that assess physician support of the ACA are most often presented in terms of 
physician clinical behaviors during the day-to-day practice of medicine (Berwick, Nolan, and 
Whittington, 2008, p. 759; Friedberg, et al., 2015). Point-of-care behaviors are responses by 
physicians to implementations of the ACA in their license jurisdictions. Frequently how 
physicians deliver care is heavily influenced by their self-interest in preserving the status quo 
rather than conforming to provisions of reform legislation (Friedberg, Chen, Van Bususm, 
Aunon, Pham, Caloyeras, Mattke, Pitchforth, Quigley, Brook, Crosson, and Tutty, 2013; 
Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012). Health policy to improve the US healthcare system 
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requires that the delivery system focus on “… improving the experience of care, improving the 
health of populations, and reducing the per capita costs of health care” (Berwick, Nolan, and 
Whittington, 2008, p. 759; Friedberg, et al., 2015). Policymakers generally intend to motivate 
healthcare providers through financial incentives and disincentives that meet the “rational 
common needs” of US society and includes the goal of improving the quality of the life of all 
Americans (Berwick, Nolan, and Whittington, 2008, p. 761). Physicians may see the changes 
under the ACA as challenges to their legal medical authority rather than a means to control costs 
and spending on care. 
Fundamentally, if health policy is able to effectively regulate spending controls at the 
point-of-purchase and improve the patient-provider interaction, then, equitable social benefits 
between the costs paid by government, the self-interest from reimbursement received by 
providers, and the best interests of patients can be optimally accomplished (Enthoven and Singer, 
1999). Health policy, such as the ACA, that impacts the distribution of money through delivery 
system reform risks an increase in provider self-interest over public interest. This risk is 
especially salient if the policy challenges the opinions of physicians about what is proper care 
and for whom it should be provided (Enthoven and Singer, 1999; Hill, Wilkinson, and Holahan, 
2014; Mintrom, 1997).  
Friedberg et al. (2013, p. xvi-xvii) found that physicians viewed the imposition of rules 
through national legislation to be “… obstacles to providing high quality care” and not in their 
individual or collective interests. As a result, they would probably not abide by the rules in 
practice. As the legislative constraints increase the impact on physician clinical practice patterns, 
they are likely exit private practice and move their practices into different business models 
(Friedberg et al., 2013; Physicians Foundation, 2012). A newer study by Friedberg et al. (2015) 
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confirmed that changes in clinical practice patterns were related to physicians’ opinions about 
the ACA and are projected to continue to impact clinical practices through the near future.  
As implementation of the ACA continues through the decade, these type actions by 
physicians that change their relationships with patients may be further exacerbated through an 
increasing focus on cost containment from private payers. Private payers, while not impacted by 
the ACA the same as public payers, are following the lead of government in regulating 
reimbursable procedures over the objections of physicians’ clinical expertise (Physicians 
Foundation, 2012). Friedberg et al.’s study (2013, p. xviii) also noted that as physicians exit 
private practice and become employees in care delivery systems such as ACOs and hospital 
systems, there is “… increased pressure to provide greater quantities of services” from those 
organization. The system demand for more services is about using system provided services to 
the degree they are horizontally integrated throughout the patient care continuum. The 
significance of this emerging trend may be an over-utilization of lower cost non-reimbursable 
services on a more frequent basis as a mechanism of cost recovery through direct payments from 
patients. This cost-shifting to patients and away from payers occurs in the form of higher 
insurance deductibles, co-insurance, and co-pays (Patel and Rushefsky, 2014). Thus, while cost 
containment goals may reduce federal spending on healthcare, the actual cost will remain the 
same or rise higher as reform policy shifts physicians from one care delivery system to another. 
The role of care delivery systems, for instance ACOs, is increasingly influential upon 
physician opinions as they transition from business owners in private practice to employees 
(Merritt Hawkins, 2014). While typically self-interest is a personal characteristic, self-interest 
from a central organizational perspective can also be reinforced through collective membership 
and polycentric governance relationships enabled through employment (Ostrom, 2005). In this 
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case, the self-interest of the physician, keeping a satisfactory employment relationship for 
instance, is removed from the forefront of care delivery decisions, but is still a driving force in 
decision-making as collective choice is exercised (Ostrom, 1990). Integrating physician self-
interest into palatable community/public interest is key to gaining policy support by physician 
stakeholders who are still the primary appropriators of the community’s healthcare resources 
under the ACA (Friedberg, et al., 2013; Ostrom, 1990). 
Physicians through their non-clinical roles shape policy in their participation, or lack 
thereof, in the political system by assisting and supporting legislators in setting the healthcare 
agenda in their state jurisdictions (Bonica, Rosenthal, and Rothman, 2014). It is unlikely that 
meaningful health system reform can occur by either passing legislation or public advocacy 
alone without physician support, given the relationship of state-licensed physicians to spending, 
quality, and cost of healthcare (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013). Kumar, Sherwood, and 
Sutaria (2013) looked at the engagement of physicians’ behavior about expected changes in the 
healthcare system under the ACA. Their study surveyed 1,400 physicians in an investigation of 
the alignment of day-to-day operations in physicians’ practice environments with the physician’s 
attitudes toward making changes in their traditional care delivery system (Kumar, Sherwood, and 
Sutaria, 2013, p. 5). The study’s conclusion suggests that physician motivation under at least 
some of the ACA provisions was less about improving the care delivery system or patient health 
status and more about increasing revenue. Physicians, the investigators concluded, seem more 
concerned with compensation, followed by their desire to practice autonomously as part of the 
status quo (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013, p. 5). The findings by Kumar, Sherwood, and 
Sutaria should not be surprising to policy-makers. Providing healthcare services, especially at the 
primary care provider level, is, by and large, a commodity business, meaning, “… there is little 
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difference in the quality of service between providers …” especially as policy continues to focus 
on costs rather than patient experience (Burney, 2012, p. 2).  
Since the passage of the ACA and through its mandate to insure the masses and increase 
primary care services while cutting reimbursement, the relationship between independent 
primary care physicians and the care delivery system has not been completely beneficial to 
physicians’ independent autonomous status (Jackson Healthcare, 2013). In 2000, about 57% of 
physician practices were independently owned rather than practicing physicians being engaged 
in an employment relationship (Accenture, 2012, p. 2; Elliott, 2012, p. 2). In 2012, the 
independent ownership of physician practices declined to 39% and is expected to fall further 
through 2020 as a consequence of health policy under current ACA legislation (Physicians 
Foundation, 2010; Accenture, 2012, p. 2; Elliott, 2012, p. 2, Jackson Healthcare, 2013, p.6).  
The shift in the management and ownership of physician practices as influenced by the 
ACA may signal an environment where APRNs are accepted as equivalent practitioners to their 
PCP counterparts (Kirchoff, 2013; FTC, 2014). According to Jackson Healthcare (2013, p. 6) 
39% of physicians under the age of 45 have never worked in private practice, with 32% of that 
group choosing an employment relationship to avoid direct involvement in the management of a 
medical practice. Younger PCPs may be inclined to be more supportive of IA APRNs due to 
their choices of employment over practice business ownership. Jackson & Coker (2013, p. 10-
15) and also Zismer, (2011) found that physicians’ attitudes were overwhelmingly negative 
about the impact of the ACA on their compensation (71%), their workload (61%), their ability to 
continue to make independent treatment decisions (57%), their practice’s revenue per patient 
(69%), and the amount of professional time lost to administrative requirements under the ACA 
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(66%). These data and employment preference by younger physicians seem to suggest that 
physician attrition out of private practice may be important to successful adoption of the ACA. 
Antiel, Curlin, James, and Tilburt (2009) and Antiel, James, Egginton, Sheeler, Liebow, 
Goold, and Tilburt (2014) found that physician doubts about the benefits to them from health 
reform is not a motivation to become active in national policy-making arenas. Physicians in 
general do agree that their professional responsibility includes influencing how care is delivered 
in their local practice areas. Interested physicians assist in writing state and local legislation, 
champion state health policy legislation, and support performance changes in the physician-
patient policy arena all the while making care delivery purchase decisions enabled or sanctioned 
by that same health policy (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012; Jones, 2013; Kumar, 
Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013). The lack of involvement in national health policy development 
means that physician involvement in state policy efforts is after the fact of mandated reform. As 
such, the physician collective may not support health reform simply by not engaging in its 
adoption in their local practice jurisdictions.  
Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria (2013, p. 3) found in a survey of 1400 practicing 
physicians that 84% were willing to make changes in the way they practice medicine. However, 
when asked specifically what ACA changes they had implemented only 17% of their 
respondents indicated they had actually made changes in their practice (Kumar, Sherwood, and 
Sutaria, 2013, p. 4). These “disconnects” between what is said and actually done in support of 
the ACA seem to suggest that the physician collective is not being adequately engaged to follow 
through to make the changes necessary for reform (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013). In 
2014, only 11 out of 50 states had implemented Medicaid expansion which is a keystone 
provision of the ACA intended to increase access to care for previously uninsured citizens (Keith 
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and Lucia, 2014, p. 7). One problem for physicians with the Medicaid expansion is that Medicaid 
reimbursement is typically the lowest rate of reimbursement in their practice (Decker, 2012). In a 
study of 1460 PCPs, more than one-third of physician practices indicated they would not provide 
services to patients under Medicaid expansion (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011, p. 7). With 
inadequate physician participation in the Medicaid expansion which is projected to provide 
subsidized insurance to 32 million new patients, the traditional care delivery system will be 
virtually unchanged under reform provisions of the ACA (Decker, 2012; Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2011, p. 1).  
Physician opinions about supporting health reform seem to favor no change to the status 
quo based on the actions many physicians have taken so far (Jackson Coker, 2013; Keith and 
Lucia, 2014). Physicians indicate the care delivery system needs to be modified, but there is 
evidence to suggest they are not willing to make changes under the ACA (Kumar, Sherwood, 
and Sutaria, 2013). Not engaging in national policy initiatives and not supporting state adoption 
of many parts of the ACA appears to be a statement from physicians about their entitlement in 
the business of healthcare. Whether physicians support the ACA and the lack of successful 
implementation of key parts of the act seems to suggest that reform of the care delivery system is 
dependent on physician engagement (Keith and Lucia, 2014). Engagement in policy processes 
may be a matter of reconciling physician attitudes about the ACA with their beliefs about how 
the care delivery system should be changed. Physician attitudes seem to be oriented toward 
interests associated with clinical factors rather than the cost containment interests of payers. 
Understanding the core beliefs of the physician collective that reinforce their opinions about 
reform may be important for successful adoption of IA APRN health policy in their states’ 
jurisdiction (Sabatier, 1988). 
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Ideology as a Mechanism of Influence on Physician Opinions 
Ideology is a system of shared attitudes and opinions based on beliefs that are context 
specific and generally symbolic in attribution (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Shanahan, Jones, 
McBeth, and Lane, 2013). Ideology is best understood as a symbolic representation of individual 
beliefs and opinions about a position or an issue. A person’s ideology guides how they behave in 
context of an issue or position. Ideology also serves as a mechanism for individuals to self-
identify with a group of like-minded individuals who take sides on an issue in opposition to 
others (Cobb and Elder, 1973; Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013). Conover and 
Feldman (1981) suggested that the public, presumably most individuals included, does not have 
an understanding of the meanings of ideological labels such as liberal and conservative, but still 
makes fairly consistent choices about which side of an issue to join. Accordingly, the ideology 
labels of conservative and liberal are the basis of political discourse of all types and serve to 
alienate or disenfranchise people who do not or cannot share similar attitudes and opinions 
(Federico, 2009). It is the similarity of individuals’ beliefs and/or opinions that may influence an 
individual to support or oppose an issue based simply on group affiliation (Bandura, 2000; 
Federico, 2009; Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin, 2013). 
Ideology serves to assist individuals in evaluating their position about an issue by 
blending together multiple points of view on a range of topics into a common perspective rather 
than being strictly evaluative about the single topic or issue (Conover and Feldman, 1981; 
Federico, 2009). Ideology is often represented as a polar scale with conservative at one end and 
liberal at the other end. Ideology is a symbolic representation that is tied to the groups an 
individual identifies with through membership or affiliation and becomes part of an individual’s 
belief system (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009). For instance, liberals as a group tend to believe 
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that government should solve problems, such as healthcare costs, while conservatives tend to 
believe that individual empowerment is the means of problem-solving and social stability 
(Conover and Feldman, 1981; Jost, 2006). Ideologies both bring people and interests together 
and at times drives them apart with vehemence. Throughout history ideologies have been vilified 
as cultural phenomena that pit one set of peoples against another such as polarizing Marxist 
socialism in comparison to capitalism (Jost, 2006).  
Jost (2006, p. 654) characterizes ideology as a contrast of attitudes about “… social 
change versus tradition” which is simply the conflict between innovation and the status quo. Jost 
(2006) establishes that ideology provides meaning to the behaviors people engage and gives 
others a way to gravitate toward like-mindedness. Jost (2006) also states that while ideology 
seemingly is related to self-interest(s), it is also the case that ideology is related to group 
identification rather than being simply an internalized behavioral construct. As individuals 
become part of a collective there is a tendency to “engage in system justification” even when 
such behaviors are counter-productive with rational social change (Jost, 2006, p. 655).  
Conservatives tend to exhibit behaviors that are related to self-interest while liberals tend 
to exhibit behaviors toward the common good which is also a “classic” distinction between 
support for hierarchy and individual equality (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009, p. 310). 
Individual behaviors are not mutually exclusive to a particular ideology, but are displayed as a 
tendency to “be” ideologically conservative or liberal in terms of an individual’s beliefs through 
symbolic meaning (Cobb and Elder, 1973). Sabatier (1988, p. 145; Heintz and Jenkins-Smith, 
1988, p. 266) refers to ideology as being a part of the set of “deep (normative) core beliefs” that 
are firmly entrenched and difficult to change and which establishes the sides of issues related to 
differences in opinions about policy. The core beliefs represent the strength of association for a 
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policy topic/issue by agents in a policy arena (Weible, Heikkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2011). 
The liberal perspective tends to be associated with willingness to accept or stimulate political 
change, while the conservative perspective tends toward the status quo and the need to maintain 
order and familiar social structure (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009).  
Since the passage of the ACA, the U.S. Congress and the public alike are nearly evenly 
divided along ideological and political party lines about the benefits, value, and usefulness of the 
ACA which favors strong federal control over healthcare delivery (Doherty and Tyson, 2014). In 
fact, when the ACA was passed there was not a single Republican vote for passage of the Act, 
even though the legislation was modeled after a Republican-authored health reform in 
Massachusetts (Gruber, 2011a; Joyce, 2010). Republicans tend toward a conservative ideology 
while Democrats exhibit a liberal ideology. The implications of such party line voting are that 
reactions to policy such as the ACA may be more about group–based ideological identification 
rather than the substance of the policy per se (Bonica, Rosenthal, and Rothman, 2014). Zschirnt 
(2011) in fact suggests that it is not the specific policy that elicits negative support from the 
public and professionals, but rather the fact that the policy was promoted by a single political 
group/party with a divergent ideology to those who oppose or support it.  
Zschirnt (2011, p. 692) evaluated ideological self-identity and views on politically 
charged issues through analysis of the 2004 National Election Study. Zschirnt confirms previous 
studies that suggest that “feelings” toward an issue is really about which group(s), labor, 
business, religion, or APRNs, symbolize support for or opposition to a policy rather than the 
meaningfulness of the policy (Zschirnt, 2011). Tesler (2012) studied group influences 
surrounding the ACA by looking at cross-sectional data from the American National Election 
Study (ANES) and the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP). Tesler’s (2012, p. 693) 
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mixed method approach that included interview observations of 3,147 CCAP participants in 
addition to the ANES data suggested that there was a grouping of individual opinions about the 
ACA around racial affiliation. One conclusion based on the Tesler study “… whether using 
ANES or CCAP panel data …” is that “… racial attitudes became more important in white 
Americans’ beliefs about health care …” rather other related groups or legislation alone (Tesler, 
2012, p. 696). Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin (2013) looking at different data sets similarly found 
that white Americans as a group were less supportive of the ACA than were blacks or other 
groups of Americans. These findings in terms of support for the ACA are possibly more 
associated with in/out group affiliation as a result of racial membership rather than racial bias per 
se (Jost, 2006; Tesler, 2015). 
According to the Association of American Medical Colleges (2010, p. 17), 75% of 
physicians practicing medicine in the US are white, well educated, and affluent. If indeed the 
racial spillover effects from policy advocacy for the ACA as described by Tesler and Lewis, 
Dowe, and Franklin are consistent throughout the US population (Tesler, 2012; Lewis, Dowe, 
and Franklin, 2013), physicians as an group may have de facto difficulty supporting the ACA or 
any meaningful efforts to change the traditional care system simply because of the supporting 
groups associated with the health policy rather than the meaningfulness, benefits, or incentives to 
be derived from the policy (Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg, 2010; Zschirnt, 2011). The PCP 
collective as an exclusive group of individuals through the nature of its limited membership may 
perceive non-members who advocate change to the collective’s exclusive membership rules as a 
challenge to the beliefs and opinions of individual members (Cobb and Elder, 1973). In the face 
of evidence to the contrary individual group members may espouse the messages of the group 
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and deny the legitimacy of the desired change simply based on individuals or groups who 
support the change (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013; Stone, 1989).  
A Pew Research study in 2014 found that there are cohesive groups that form out of 
influences from ideology. Group opinions and attitudes are likely to be shared among group 
members irrespective of individual member opinions and attitudes (Dimock, Doherty, Kiley, and 
Krishnamurthy, 2014, p.2). Business conservatives, as one such group, tend to have beliefs and 
attitudes that are steadfast conservative in political value orientation, tend to prefer free markets, 
and overwhelmingly oppose the Obama administration and its policies (Dimock et al, 2014, p. 
6). Business conservatives, about 27% of registered voters, tend to be overwhelmingly white and 
male, well educated, affluent, and tend to be politically active. As a group they are similar in 
makeup to that of the US physician community (American Association of Medical Colleges, 
2010, p. 17; American Association of Medical Colleges, 2013; Dimock et al, 2014, p. 6). 
Business conservatives who are also physicians predictably would tend to support the models of 
care delivery that reward increases in services utilization through the status quo fee-for-service 
care delivery system rather than expanding the delivery system with IA APRNs (Berwick and 
Hackbarth, 2012).  
Through the status quo/traditional care delivery system, physicians unilaterally determine 
how many patients to add or maintain in their practice in response to legislation and regulation 
such as the ACA (Jacobson, Earle, and Newhouse, 2011). The ability of physicians to claim 
reimbursement in a self-beneficial manner shapes the business of healthcare and related 
treatment decisions as well as influencing patient decisions about access to care services and 
their treatment (Berwick, 2013). It is plausible, therefore, that ideologically conflicting 
legislation that attempts to modify or eliminate the traditional the status quo would be perceived 
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as a negative value to individual physicians in some instances. The negative valuation by 
physicians would likely result in a bias toward reform and possibly extend their bias to positive 
features of reform legislation even in the face of evidence to the contrary. 
Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter outlined a review of scholarly literature that is representative of the state of 
knowledge about the possible influences on physicians’ opinions about IA APRNs. The scope of 
potential influences was narrowed for study through a critical review of relevant literature to 
identify the most likely associations with physician opinions. The value proposition of APRNs in 
primary care was presented as a confirmation of why IA APRNs are a reasonable solution for 
reform of the care delivery system. From that basis the purpose for the research question of why 
do some PCPs support IA APRNs while others do not was established. Assessing the research 
question fills a gap in the literature about why there is not broad acceptance of IA APRNs by 
PCPs. Collective choice theory was rationalized as the study’s theoretical orientation in the 
context of care delivery. It was observed that challenges to the status quo may cause physician 
opinions to be biased against a broad range of mandated reform including support for IA APRNs.  
Through the review of literature several potential influences on physician opinions were 
identified and are included as independent variables in the study. Physician gender and race are 
observed to be possible differentiators for their opinions about APRNs. The restrictions from 
state scope-of-practice laws was found to suggest a possible alignment with physician opinions 
about APRNs. Some states that permit IA APRN practice demonstrated positive cost and access 
outcomes and general support by physicians in those jurisdictions (Conover and Richards, 2015; 
Oliver, Pennington, and Reville, 2015).  
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Based on the review of literature, several personal factors of physicians may be 
influences on their opinions about APRNs. The two key concepts of this study: 1) ideology and, 
2) support of the ACA are seen as likely potential influences on physicians’ opinions (Jost, 2006; 
Keith and Lucia, 2014). Physicians’ length of time in practice is a possible influence on their 
opinions about APRNs (Jackson Coker, 2013). The relative age of physicians’ practicing primary 
care is seen as a potential association with physicians’ opinions about APRNs. Changes in 
physicians’ support of the ACA over time was identified as a possible factor in physicians’ 
support of APRNs in the literature review (Jackson Coker, 2013). The physician’s non-clinical 
role in their medical practice is recognized as a possible influence on their opinions about 
APRNs in several prior studies (Zismer, 2013). The working relationship physicians have with 
APRNs is also a likely influence on physicians’ opinions (Street and Cossman, 2010).  
In the literature review, particular attention was paid to the physician-patient policy arena 
in order to understand the role of non-physician stakeholders on physician opinions about 
APRNs. Several influences in the physician-patient policy arena were reviewed as foundation for 
the study’s independent variables ideology and support for the ACA. The ACA’s 
recommendation of IA APRNs as peers to physicians in primary care was established as a 
representative component of the ACA. As such, physicians’ opinions about APRNs in clinical 
practice is identified as the study’s dependent variable. The relative level of physician ideology 
and support for the ACA are promising as indicators of physician support of APRNs. 
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Chapter Three - Research Design 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the study’s research question, hypotheses about the research 
question, and methods of analysis, measurement, survey instrument, data collection, and 
variables of interest in the study. The study poses ten (10) hypotheses that may lead to insights 
about the research question. The dependent variable in the study is PCP opinions about APRNs. 
The study investigates the direction of ideology and support for the ACA as independent 
variables on PCPs’ opinions about IA APRNs. Characteristics of the respondents are included as 
independent variables describing demographics and their clinical practice. The demographic 
variables are: age, gender and race. Variables related to physicians’ clinical practice are: length 
of time in practice, state of practice/licensure, non-clinical role in the medical practice, and 
whether the respondent works with APRNs. PCPs in the regionally adjoining states of Alabama, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma are the population of PCPs from which the 
study sample was drawn. All of these states currently restrict APRN practice. 
Institutional Review Board Approval 
An online survey, described later, is used to gather data about the study variables. The 
survey instrument and solicitation messages were submitted to and approved by the University of 
Arkansas Institutional Review Board (IRB). A copy of the IRB approval letter to conduct the 
study is included in Appendix A. The text of the initial and follow-up solicitation emails is 
included in Appendix B. The complete survey instrument is included in Appendix C. 
Research Question 
The study’s research question is: Why do some primary care physicians support independent 
autonomous practice for advanced practice registered nurses while others do not? 
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Hypotheses 
The hypotheses about the research question are presented in Table 3.1. The table outlines 
each of the study’s hypotheses and identifies the independent variables to be tested. The groups 
to be compared through analysis are also identified in Table 3.1. Additional details describing the 
independent variables appear in succeeding sections of this chapter. 
Table 3. 1 Hypotheses, Independent Variables, and Comparison Groups 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Comparison Groups 
1. PCPs who are more ideologically conservative are less 
supportive of IA APRNs than PCPs who are more ideologically 
liberal. 
Ideology 
Composite 
∑ Q36-Q41 
(Min 6-Max 30) 
Conservative < 16  
Liberal > 20 
2. PCPs who support the ACA are more supportive of IA 
APRNs than PCPs who do not support the ACA. 
ACA 
Composite 
∑ Q20-Q29 
(Min 10-Max 50) 
Support < 29 
Oppose > 31 
3. PCPs who have been practicing longer than 20 years are less 
likely to support IA APRNs than PCPs who have been 
practicing less than 20 years. 
Q34 Time in 
Practice 
> 20 years 
≤ 20 years 
4. PCPs who practice medicine as employees are more likely to 
support IA APRNs than PCPs who do not. 
Q44 Role in 
Practice 
Employees 
Non-employees 
5. PCPs who are younger than 60 years of age are more likely 
to support IA APRNs than those PCPs who are older. Q30 Age 
< 60 years of age 
≥ 60 years of age 
6. PCPs in AR with less restrictive scope-of-practice laws are 
more likely to support IA APRNs than PCPs in OK with more 
restrictive scope-of-practice laws. 
Q43 State of 
Licensure 
Arkansas (least) 
Oklahoma (most) 
7. PCPs who work with APRNs are more likely to support IA 
APRNs than PCPs who do not work with APRNs 
Q46 Work 
with APRN 
Work with APRN 
No work with APRN 
8. PCPs whose opinions have changed to be more supportive of 
the ACA are more likely to support IA APRNs than PCPs 
whose opinions have changed to be less supportive of the ACA. 
Q3 ACA 
Opinion 
Change 
More Supportive 
Less Supportive 
9. Female PCPs are more likely to support IA APRNs than 
male PCPs. Q31 Gender 
Male 
Female 
10. Non-Caucasian PCPs are more likely to support IA APRNs 
than Caucasian PCPs Q32 Race 
Non-Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Note: See Appendix C for question wording. 
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Variables and Measures 
Table 3.2 is a summary describing the survey’s question set characteristics. In the 
sections following Table 3.2 are detailed explanations of the questions associated with each 
variable in the study, the response categories of each variable type, and relevant variable scoring. 
Table 3. 2 Summary of Question Set Construction 
Question Set Question List Question Type Range of Response 
PCP Opinion about APRNs 
(Dependent Variable) Q5-Q16 
Dependent Variable 
(Continuous) 
Min. 12 Max 60 
Composite Score 
Support for ACA Q20-Q29 Independent Variable (Continuous) 
Min 10 Max 50 
Composite Score 
Ideology Q36-Q41 Independent Variable (Continuous) 
Min 6 Max 30 
Composite Score 
Respondent Characteristics Q3, Q30-Q34 Q43, Q44, Q46 
Independent Variable 
(Primarily Ordinal; 
Nominal as 
appropriate) 
Yes/No 
Select a Group 
Likert Item 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, PCP Opinions about IA APRNs, is derived from a set of twelve 
(12) statements about APRNs working in the primary care practice setting. Each statement is 
intended to elicit a respondent’s level of agreement or disagreement. The statements were 
originally developed by Acquilino et al (1999) and were also used by Street and Cossman 
(2010). Respondents are asked to choose their response to each statement from five Likert items 
scaled as strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The 
items are scored on a five point scale from 1 to 5. A score of 1 is most supportive of APRNs and 
5 is least supportive of APRNs. Three (3) is a neutral score. A composite Likert score is 
calculated by summing the response score for each of the 12 statements. The larger the 
composite score, the less supportive the response is toward APRNs. The minimum score, most 
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supportive of APRNs, is 12. The maximum score, least supportive of APRNs, is 60. The 
composite response score suggests the strength and direction of the respondent’s opinion about 
APRNs. A “no response” or missing value to any statement in the 12 item set excludes that 
respondent/case from any analysis involving the dependent variable. No composite score is 
computed for a case with a missing value on any statement relating to the dependent variable. 
The dependent variable statements in the current study’s instrument are numbered continuously 
from Q5 to Q16.  
Primary Independent Variables – Support for the ACA and Ideology 
One of the two primary independent variables in the study is support for the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). The ACA independent variable is a Likert composite score derived from ten 
(10) statements for each respondent. Statements Q20 through Q29 in the study instrument are 
intended to measure the direction and support for the ACA. The set of statements was assembled 
from statements developed by Huntoon, McCluney, Scannell, et al (2011) and Jackson Health 
Care (2012). Respondents are asked to choose their response about each statement from five 
Likert items scaled as strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, and strongly 
agree. The Likert items were scored from 1 to 5 with 3 being a neutral response. The composite 
Likert score ranges from 10, least supportive, to 50 more supportive of the ACA. A “no 
response” or missing value to any question in the set excludes that respondent’s case from any 
analysis involving this independent variable and no composite score for that case is produced.  
Three groups are created based on the distribution of respondents’ Likert scores for this 
variable. The groups, support the ACA, neutral on the ACA, and do not support the ACA, are 
created using approximately equal class intervals from the range of response scores. Support for 
the ACA and do not support the ACA were included in the analysis. The “neutral on the ACA” 
64 
 
group was created to account for the likelihood that not all respondents are likely to either 
support or not support the ACA. The interval cut-points from the composite score are calculated 
from actual responses.3  
The second primary independent variable of interest is a measure suggesting the 
respondent’s ideological leaning. Ideology is represented on a polar scale of conservative to 
liberal. There are six (6) statements in the study instrument that are summed to produce an 
ideology Likert/composite score for each respondent. Statements Q36 to Q41 are statements 
measuring the ideological leaning of the respondent. The item set for ideology was derived from 
a Pew Research (2014) study. Respondents are asked to choose their response about the 
statement from five Likert items scaled as strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, 
agree, and strongly agree. The Likert items were scored from 1, conservative, to 5, liberal. The 
composite score ranges from 6 to 30 with smaller relative scores representing conservativism and 
larger scores representing a liberalism. A “no response” to any question in the set excluded that 
respondent from any analysis involving this independent variable and no composite score for that 
case was produced.  
Three groups are created based on the range of the composite score in the respondent 
population. The groups, conservative, moderate, and liberal are derived from approximately 
equal class intervals of respondents. The respondent groups conservative and liberal are included 
in the analysis. The “moderate” group is created to accommodate the likelihood that not all 
                                                 
3 For this study the cut-points derived post-analysis are: support the ACA < 29, neutral ≥ 29 ≤ 31, 
and do not support the ACA > 31. Details for the computation of the cut-points are explained 
below in Chapter 4, Univariate Data Analysis. 
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respondents are likely to be either conservative or liberal. The interval cut-points from the 
composite score are calculated from actual responses.4  
Respondent Characteristics Variables 
There are eight independent variables that represent characteristics of individual 
respondents. The independent variables describing respondents include three demographic 
characteristics and five practice characteristics. The items use a variety of question formats 
including: yes or no responses, choose a category, or Likert items. Demographic variables 
include: age (Q30), gender (Q31), and race (Q32). The items describing the respondent’s practice 
include: support of the ACA over time (Q3), years in practice (Q34), state of licensure (Q43), 
practice organization role (Q44), and the respondent’s work relationship with APRNs (Q46). 
The response categories for age, race, years in practice, and practice organization role 
were collapsed from five categories into two categories for analysis. The resulting categories 
relate to the study hypotheses and are determined as relevant for the study from the literature 
review. 
Method of Data Analysis 
The study uses a between-subject design. The study is designed to answer the research 
question by testing group differences in the study respondents. Responses to survey items 
occurred in two or more independent groups. A univariate analysis of the dependent variable and 
each of the independent variables is completed to describe the response characteristics of the 
associated variable. Bivariate testing is completed for each of ten (10) hypothesis. The bivariate 
                                                 
4 For this study the cut-points derived post-analysis are: conservative < 16, moderate ≥ 16 ≤ 20, 
and liberal > 20. Details for the computation of the cut-points are explained below in Chapter 4, 
Univariate Data Analysis. 
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method used to test hypotheses about the research question’s group differences is the t test for 
independent sample means. The p-value is set at p ≤ 05. 
Survey Instrument 
A survey instrument was designed to capture responses related to the dependent and 
independent variables in four (4) groupings or sections of question, see Table 3.2. The survey 
instrument was constructed for delivery over the internet. The survey was designed with a target 
completion time of under the (10) minutes with the average expected time to compete the survey 
of seven (7) minutes. The survey questions are organized for presentation in the instrument so 
that individual questions relating to a particular question grouping appear continuously in the 
instrument. The eight questions relating to respondent characteristics are split into sub-groups in 
no particular order. The sub-groups of respondent characteristics questions are interspersed 
between the other question sets as a convenience in the design of the survey instrument. There is 
no intended relationship in the order of presentation for the question groupings except that 
questions sets other than respondent characteristics questions appeared together in their relevant 
question group. The design of the survey instrument and techniques for administering the web 
survey are based on “The Tailored Design Method” of Dillman, Smythe, and Christian (2014).  
Study Population 
The study sampled physicians from a population of PCPs practicing adult primary care in 
five regionally adjoining states: Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma. 
States were selected to assure as much as possible that market and PCP practice influences were 
similar in terms of access and services demand for primary care services. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
summarize the state population characteristics. 
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Table 3. 3 PCP Population Characteristics - Part 1 
State 
PCP 
Sample 
N 
PCP per 
100,000 
Population 
Medicaid Enrollment 
Percent of Population 
Medicare Enrollment 
Percent of Population 
Per Capita 
Healthcare 
Spending 
Alabama 
(AL) 602 77.5 18.1% 18.3% $6272 
Arkansas 
(AR) 483 79.7 28.0% 18.7% $6167 
Louisiana 
(LA) 724 81.6 22.9% 15.6% $6795 
Mississippi 
(MS) 469 71.0 23.9% 17.3% $6571 
Oklahoma 
(OK) 861 82.8 21.2% 16.4% $6532 
Note: Study states’ PCPs per 100,000 population in primarily adult practice, average 78.5 range 77.5-
82.8 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014. Percentage of Medicaid enrollment in the population, 
average 22.8% range 18.1-27.9 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011). Percentage of Medicare 
enrollment in the population, average 17.3% range 16.4-18.7 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012). 
Per capita combined public and private healthcare spending, average $6467 range $6167-$6785 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009).  
First, the state selection considered states’ regional proximity to one another. Regional 
proximity was a consideration because of the likelihood of similarity between states’ health 
policy including APRN scope-of-practice laws (Berry and Berry, 2007). Secondly, states were 
selected if their APRN scope-of-practice regulations were restrictive. Restricted APRN scope-of-
practice was used to assure that the resulting PCP sample is similar in their clinical relationships 
with APRNs. Other selection factors included: PCPs per 100,000 population, Medicaid and 
Medicare population as a percent of the total state population, per capita healthcare spending, 
and health ranking. Finally, the similarity between all study states’ political ideology was 
considered. AL, AR, LA, and MS are part of the conservative “Solid South” political voting bloc 
(Buchanan and Kapeluck, 2014). OK is typically not considered to be a part of that descriptive 
voting bloc when characterizing population based politics. However, OK is very similar in 
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conservative voting behavior to the other states selected for the respondent population (Buchanan 
and Kapeluck, 2014; Savage, Min, Beasley, Pilcher, 2013).  
Table 3. 4 PCP Population Characteristics - Part 2 
State State Political Structure (Governor/House/Senate) 
APRN 
Scope-of-Practice 
Restriction Tasks 
(1= most - 7=least) 
National Health 
Status Rank 
(Out of 50 states 
with 1 = best) 
Alabama Repub/Repub/Repub 1 47 
Arkansas Repub/Repub/Repub 6 49 
Louisiana Repub/Repub/Repub 4 48 
Mississippi Repub/Repub/Repub 4 50 
Oklahoma Repub/Repub/Repub 2 44 
Note: National health status rankings are compiled by America’s Health Ranking, 2013. APRN scope-
of-practice restriction rating compiled by Barton Associates (2015) based on seven typical scope-
of-practice criteria ranking from most restrictive (0 out of 7) to least restrictive (7 out of 7 items).  
Respondent Sample 
The study sample is 3139 licensed primary care physicians. The individual physicians 
included in the study population are a subset of an expert panel of physicians maintained for 
various types of healthcare research by SK&A Information Systems of Irvine California 
(SK&A). SK&A is a commercial healthcare marketing firm that maintains a national panel of 
physicians who agree to periodically participate in marketing research. SK&A procured their 
initial physician list from the American Medical Association and other proprietary sources.5 
They contacted each member of the list to additional personal information, including email 
address, and asked the physician contact to volunteer as a member of their expert panel.  
Members of the SK&A expert panel are contacted at least two times each year by the list 
owner. On each contact, the list owner verifies the physician’s personal and practice 
                                                 
5 Additional details concerning the list maintenance are available on the SK&A web site at 
www.skainfo.com. 
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characteristics and confirms each individual’s willingness to receive or continue to receive email 
solicitations. Physicians in the SK&A list are not compensated for being members of the expert 
panel. However, according to SK&A, more often than not, individual solicitations of the panel 
involve some sort of compensation incentive for participation. The current study did not offer 
any type of incentive to be a member of the study sample. The list was purchased/rented for a 
two time use in this study, the initial survey solicitation and one follow-up solicitation.  
Selection criteria for the study’s physician sample are physicians who practice mostly 
adult primary care. Physicians who are certified to practice in the sub-specialties of family 
medicine, internal medicine, or general medicine and licensed in at least one of the study states 
met the criteria as adult primary care physicians. The primary discriminator in the sample of 
PCPs was the willingness to be solicited for participation by email.  
The physicians in the study sample represent a pseudo-random cross-section of PCPs in 
the study states. The sample of adult PCPs is a 20-30% subset of PCPs practicing in the five 
study states (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014). Allopathic, osteopathic, pediatric, and obstetrics 
and gynecology primary care physicians were excluded from the study population. 
Data Collection 
Each physician in the study sample received an initial email solicitation with a personal 
message from the study’s investigator requesting their participation in the study. If there was no 
response to the initial solicitation, a follow-up email request was sent ten days later. In both 
solicitations, the respondent could immediately click an active link in the solicitation email that 
would spawn the survey to their device or cut and paste the link directly into their browser of 
preference. A respondent could complete the survey on a PC, tablet, or smartphone. All 
functionality of the survey was presented in a format appropriate for the device. Respondents 
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were allowed to skip any questions they choose and/or exit the survey at any time. There are no 
risks or benefits to respondents participating in the confidential study. Each response received is 
only used in aggregate with other responses.  
The internet/online survey was created and administered using the Qualtrics electronic 
survey system. Qualtrics is a commercial firm that manages various types of survey research 
through a shared services tool. The University of Arkansas licenses the use of the Qualtrics 
system for use by faculty, staff, and students. Qualtrics manages the mailing of survey 
solicitations consistent with best practices identified in the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, which 
specifies rules for bulk emailing. The Qualtrics system tracks the email addresses of the survey’s 
panel(s) with an encrypted response ID to maintain the confidentiality of active and potential 
respondents. While survey responses are confidential, they are not anonymous. The survey 
management tools keep track of email addresses for distribution and response tracking. Data, 
such as name and title, are associated with individual email addresses in order to personalize the 
solicitation email message. Other respondent data automatically captured in the Qualtrics system 
include: time to complete the survey, date and time of day the survey was started and completed, 
whether the potential respondent opened the email solicitation, whether the email solicitation 
was bounced by the recipient email server, and geo-coordinates of the internet service provider 
where the survey was started. Best practices for data management, such as restricted access to 
the PCP sample and response items, was used to assure confidentiality of the data collected 
during the study (Dillman, Smythe, and Christian, 2014). 
Data Management 
Valid responses to the survey were captured and initially stored in the Qualtrics system. 
Access to the Qualtrics system is secured through username and password validation. Response 
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data in the Qualtrics system is organized in a spreadsheet like manner; rows corresponding to a 
unique individual and columns corresponding to the individual questions in the survey. The data 
from the Qualtrics system was downloaded in a common text-delimited file to the investigator’s 
computer. The data file was opened in Excel and scrubbed of personal data incidental to the 
study including the respondent’s email address, location, etc. The resulting Excel file was then 
imported into SPSS V22 for data analysis. 
Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter described the research design and methods used to answer the study’s 
research question. Ten hypotheses related to the research question are proposed. The population 
and sample is described along with the criteria that are used to select the population panel. The 
survey instrument construction is explained as well as the method of administration and data 
management of responses. Each variable is described, including method of measurement. The 
techniques used to calculate the scores for each variable is explained. Each statistical test to be 
used is also explained. The goal of the study is to address the primary research question and 
gather insights into the influences on PCP opinions about APRNs. The results of the study 
appear in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four - Results 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the study. The research question is: Why do some 
adult primary care physicians support independent autonomous provider status for advanced 
practice registered nurses while others do not? The study evaluates the relationship between the 
dependent variable, physicians’ opinions about supporting IA APRNs, and ideology, support for 
the ACA, and several respondent characteristics. The respondent characteristics are reported and 
univariate statistics are presented for the dependent variable and each independent variable. The 
independent-sample t test is used to evaluate each of the study’s ten (10) hypotheses about the 
dependent variable, using dichotomized groups from the study’s independent variables. The 
outcome for each bivariate test is presented. The analysis generated significant results for three 
of ten hypotheses at p ≤ .05. The level of support for the ACA on PCP opinions about APRNs 
was a significant finding as were physicians’ ideology and whether they work with APRNs in 
their medical practice. 
Response Rate 
Two solicitations were sent through email inviting PCPs in five (5) states to participate in 
a survey about health policy. The sample panel was 2995. Table 4.1 presents the response rates 
and distribution of respondents by state for the study sample panel. Two potential respondent 
subsets for each state were arbitrarily constructed by the investigator for the convenience of 
managing the solicitation distribution. Approximately half of the potential respondents from each 
state sample were allocated to each “convenience” subset prior to distribution. 
73 
 
Table 4. 1 Sample Panel Response Rates 
State Sample N Rejected 
Valid 
Responses 
State 
Response 
Rate 
Panel 
Response 
Rate 
Alabama 583 19 5 0.86% 0.17% 
Arkansas 467 13 19 4.07% 0.63% 
Louisiana 671 51 6 0.89% 0.20% 
Mississippi 456 13 6 1.32% 0.20% 
Oklahoma 818 41 16 1.96% 0.53% 
Total 2995 137 52  1.74% 
Note: Individual response rates are rounded and do not sum to the total. An outlier analysis was 
completed to assure consistency in the raw dataset. Case 6 was eliminated. Visual examination of 
Case 6 noted a pattern of extreme alternating responses throughout the response set. The final 
usable number of response sets with more than 75% of questions completed is 51 cases. 
One-hundred thirty-seven (137) of the initial sample email solicitations were 
undeliverable leaving a revised sample of 2995 out of the initial sample of 3139 (Table 4.1). The 
initial rate of respondent’s contact from the solicitation is 2.4% or 71 contacts. Of these, six (6) 
respondents indicated they were no longer in PCP roles and declined to participate in the survey. 
Thirteen (13) surveys were started and abandoned. Partial results from the abandoned surveys 
were discarded. As a result, there were 52 usable surveys for a final panel response rate of 1.7%. 
Thirty-seven percent (37%) of the usable response sets were completed by respondents in the 
state of Arkansas. Thirty-one percent (31%) of the respondents are from Oklahoma, with 12% 
each from Louisiana and Mississippi, and 10% from Alabama. 
Univariate Data Analysis 
Table 4.2 is a univariate analysis of the dependent variable. The dependent variable, PCP 
opinions about APRNs, is represented as a composite score. The composite score is created by 
summing the score across twelve individual statements, Q5 to Q16 inclusive, for each 
case/respondent. Higher scores of the dependent variable’s composite score signifies relatively 
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less agreement with the statement set and less support for APRNs. The average score for the 
dependent variable is 34.4 (SD 6.91) for all respondents. The mid-point of the possible range is 
36, suggesting a tendency to support IA APRNs in the sample. 
Table 4. 2 Dependent Variable Univariate Analysis Results 
Support of APRN 
∑ Q5-Q16 
N Cases 48 
Mean 34.4 
Median 34.0 
SD 6.91 
Min Response 20.0 
Max Response 46.0 
Possible Response Range 12 - 60 
Note: Larger values denote less supportive opinions of APRNs  
Table 4.3 presents the univariate analysis for the composite scores of the two primary 
independent variables, ideology and support for the ACA. The composite scores for these 
independent variables were transformed into groups for comparison using bivariate analysis. 
Three response categories/groups are created for testing group differences from the range of 
respondent scores. Details of the bivariate analysis appear below.  
Ideology is one of the study’s primary independent variables. It is represented as a 
composite score calculated through the sum of questions Q36 to Q41 inclusive (Table 4.3). The 
range of possible scores is 6 to 30. The average ideology score is 16.5 (SD 5.07) suggesting a 
more conservative response pattern in the sample. The minimum response score is 7 and the 
maximum is 26. Three response categories for ideology are created. First, a frequency 
distribution of the scores for the appropriate variable was produced. The mid-point of the 
possible range was identified (18). The SD of responses (5.07) was rounded to the nearest integer 
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and divided in half and rounded (3) to produce the number of intervals to include with the 
midpoint (16, 17, 18) and (18, 19, 20). The resulting class interval, for moderates, including the 
midpoint is 16-20. 
Table 4. 3 Primary Independent Variable Univariate Analysis Results 
 
Ideology 
Composite Score 
∑ Q20-Q29 
Support of ACA 
Composite Score 
∑ Q36-Q41 
N Cases 48 47 
Mean 16.5 31.5 
Median 16.5 32.0 
SD 5.07 4.44 
Min Response 7.0 23.0 
Max Response 26 40.0 
Possible Response Range 6 – 30 10 - 50 
Note: Larger ACA composite score is more supportive of ACA. 
          Larger Ideology composite score is liberal leaning. 
The second primary independent variable is support of the ACA. Support of the ACA is a 
composite variable created by summing the individual responses to Q20 through Q29 (Table 
4.3). Three response categories for support of the ACA are created. The categories are 
established using approximately equal response classes including the midpoint. First, a frequency 
distribution of the scores was produced. The mid-point of the possible range was identified (30) 
and is included in the new class. The SD of responses (4.4) was divided in half and rounded to 
nearest integer (2) to produce the number of intervals to include with the midpoint (29, 30) and 
(30, 31). The resulting class interval, neutral on ACA, including the midpoint is 29-31. 
Table 4.4 indicates that 46% of respondents completed responses determined to be 
ideologically conservative. Thirty percent (30%) of the respondents are moderates with 25% 
ideologically liberal leaning. Responses derived from the “Support of ACA” composite score 
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suggest that 51% of respondents support the ACA, 32% do not support the ACA, and 17% are 
neutral. Sixty-four percent (64%) of respondents work with APRNs three days or more per week 
(Table 4.4).  
Table 4. 4 Significant Independent Variable Univariate Analyses 
Variable NT 
Response 1 
Label – %  (N) 
Response 2 
Label – (% - N) 
Response 3 
Label – (% - N) 
Ideology 48 Conservative 46% (N=22) 
Moderate 
29% (N=14) 
Liberal 
25% (N=12) 
Support of ACA 47 Do Not Support 32% (N=15) 
Neutral 
17% (N=8) 
Support 
51% (N=24) 
Work with APRNs 50 Yes 64% (N=32) 
No 
36% (N=18)  
Note: Some numbers do not sum to the totals due to rounding 
As seen in Table 4.5, 84% of the study respondents are male. Forty-six percent (46%) of 
respondents are aged 60 years or older and 78% of respondents are Caucasian (Table 4.5).  
Table 4. 5 Respondent Demographic Characteristics – Not Significant 
Variable NT Response 1 Response 2 Response3 Response 4 Response 5 
Gender 50 Male 84% (N=42) 
Female 
16% (N=8)  
Age 50 35 or less 8% (N=4) 
Age 36 – 45 
16% (N=8) 
Age 46 – 54 
22% (N=11) 
Age 55 – 59 
8% (N=4) 
Age 60 + 
46% (N=23) 
Race 50 Native Amer. 4% (N=2) 
Asian 
4% (N=2) 
Black 
8% (N=4) 
Caucasian 
78% (N=39) 
Other 
6% (N=3) 
Note: Some numbers do not sum to the totals due to rounding 
From Table 4.6, when asked if their opinions about the ACA had changed, 49% of the 
respondents reported their current opinion is the same as it was in 2010. Twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the respondents are less supportive of the ACA currently compared with their opinion 
in 2010 and 27% respondents are now more supportive of the ACA.  
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Table 4. 6 Respondent Univariate Practice Characteristics – Not Significant 
Variable NT Response 1 Response 2 Response3 Response 4 Response 5 
Change 
in ACA 
Support 
over time 
49 
Less 
Supportive 
25% (N=12) 
Same 
Support 
49% (N=24) 
More 
Supportive 
27% (N=13) 
Time in 
Practice 50 
1 - 5 Years 
10% (N=5) 
6 - 10 Years 
10% (N=5) 
11 - 15 Years 
14% (N=7) 
16 -19 Years 
8% (N=4) 
≥ 20 Years 
58% (N=29) 
Role in 
Practice 50 
Owner/Solo 
8% (N=4) 
Partner/P.A. 
18% (N=9) 
Employee 
64% (N=32) 
Contractor 
4% (N=2) 
Other 
6% (N=3) 
State of 
License 50 
Alabama 
10% (N=5) 
Arkansas 
36% (N=18) 
Louisiana 
12% (N=6) 
Mississippi 
12% (N=6) 
Oklahoma 
30% (N=15) 
Note: Some numbers do not sum to the totals due to rounding 
Fifty-seven percent (58%) of the completed surveys are from respondents who had 
practiced medicine post-residency for 20 or more years. Fourteen percent (14%) report being in 
practice for 11-15 years, 8% for 16-19 years, and 10% report practicing medicine for 1-5 years or 
6-10 years. Sixty-four percent (64%) of the respondents indicate they are employees in their 
practice. Thirty-six percent (36%) of respondents are from Arkansas, a least restrictive scope-of-
practice state, with 30% from Oklahoma, a most restrictive scope-of-practice state (Table 4.6).  
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 summarize the results of difference of bivariate means tests for the 
study’s ten hypotheses. 
Bivariate Data Analysis/Hypothesis Testing  
Table 4.7 presents results for the hypotheses that were statistically significant and the 
research hypothesis accepted (p ≤ .05). Table 4.8 summarizes the results that were not 
statistically significant and the null hypotheses could not be rejected. For each hypothesis, test 
groups were dichotomized from responses to individual questions or derived from composite 
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scores as appropriate to the specific independent variable. Independent samples t test were then 
used to compare mean PCP levels of support of APRNs across groups.  
Hypothesis 1: PCPs who are more ideologically conservative are less supportive of IA 
APRNs than PCPs who are more ideologically liberal. Mean for support of IA APRNs by 
conservative PCPs is 35.6 (SD 7.50) and by liberal PCPs is 30.8 (SD 7.38). The difference in 
means test indicates that the difference is statistically significant (t(30) = 1.68) at p ≤ .05, 
confirming Hypothesis 1 (Table 4.7).  
Table 4. 7 Significant Difference in Support of APRN Means Test Results p ≤ .05 
Hypothesis 
(Grp 1 - Grp 2) NT Group 1 Group 2 
P Value 
1-Tailed      t Test       
Hypothesis 1 
Ideology 
(Cons < Lib) 
32 
M=35.6 
SD=7.50 
N=22 
M=30.8 
SD=7.38 
N=10 
p=.050 t(30) = 1.68 * 
Hypothesis 2 
ACA Support 
(More > Less) 
38 
M=31.2 
SD=6.27 
N=23 
M=40.3 
SD=4.92 
N=15 
p=.000 t(36) = - 4.71 * 
Hypothesis 7 
Work With APRN 
(Yes > No) 
47 
M=33.1 
SD=6.83 
N=30 
M=36.6 
SD=6.87 
N=17 
p=.049 t(45) = - 1.69 * 
Note: *p ≤ .05. Distribution is normal with equal variances. 
Hypothesis 2: PCPs who support the ACA are more supportive of IA APRNs than PCPs 
who do not support the ACA. Mean support of IA APRNs by PCPs who support the ACA is 31.2 
(SD 6.27), in contrast with a mean of 40.3 (SD 4.92) for PCPs who do not support the ACA 
(Table 4.7). The difference in means is statistically significant with t(36) = -4.71 at p ≤ .05. The 
null hypothesis is rejected and the research hypothesis is accepted.  
Hypothesis 7: PCPs who work with APRNs are more likely to support IA APRNs than 
PCPs who do not work with APRNs. The results reported in Table 4.7 indicate that the mean for 
support of IA APRNs is 33.1 (SD 6.83) for PCPs who work with APRNs and 36.6 (SD 6.87) for 
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PCPs who do not work with APRNs. The difference in means test indicates the difference is 
statistically significant (t(45) = - 1.69). The null hypothesis is rejected and the research 
hypothesis is accepted (Table 4.7).  
Table 4. 8 No Difference in Support of APRN Means Test Results p ≤ .05 
Hypothesis 
(Grp 1-Grp 2) NT Group 1 Group 2 
P Value 
1-Tailed t Test 
Hypothesis 3 
Time in Practice 
( ≥20y) > (< 20y ) 
47 
M=35.3 
SD=7.20 
N=26 
M=33.0 
SD=6.60 
N=21 
p=.108 t(45) = 1.25 
Hypothesis 4 
Role in Practice 
(Empl > NonE) 
47 
M=34.8 
SD=6.68 
N=30 
M=33.8 
SD=7.65 
N=17 
p=.320 t(45) = .47 
Hypothesis 5 
Age 
(< 60 yo) > (≥ 60 yo) 
47 
M=34.0 
SD=7.07 
N=26 
M=34.9 
SD=7.02 
N=21 
p=.694 t(45) = - .40 
Hypothesis 6 
Restrictive SOP 
(AR > OK) 
33 
M=36.1 
SD=5.87 
N=18 
M=33.4 
SD=9.23 
N=15 
p=.161 t(31) = 1.00 
Hypothesis 8 
Changed ACA 
Opinion  
(More > Less) 
24 
M=32.4 
SD=7.73 
N=12 
M=36.0 
SD=8.42 
N=12 
p=.144 t(22) = - 1.09 
Hypothesis 9  
Gender 
(Female > Male) 
47 
M=31.8 
SD=6.07 
N=8 
M=34.9 
SD=7.10 
N=39 
p=.121 t(45) = -1.19 
Hypothesis 10 
Race 
(Noncauc > Cauc) 
47 
M=34.4 
SD=6.55 
N=10 
M=34.4 
SD=4.18 
N=37 
p=.499 t(45) = -.00 
Note: *p ≤.05. Distribution is normal with equal variances. 
Hypothesis 3: PCPs who have been practicing longer than 20 years are less likely to 
support IA APRNs than PCPs who have been practicing less than 20 years. The results presented 
in Table 4.8 indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. PCPs practicing 20 years or 
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longer had a mean for support of IA APRNs of 35.3 (SD 7.20). PCPs in practice for less than 20 
years produced a mean of 33.0 (SD 6.60). The t value is t(45) = 1.25 (Table 4.8).  
Hypothesis 4: PCPs who practice medicine as employees are more likely to support IA 
APRNs than PCPs who do not. Table 4.8 indicates that the mean support for IA APRNs for PCP 
employees is 33.83 (SD 6.68) and for PCP non-employees is 33.8 (SD 7.65). The difference in 
means test did not produce a statistically significant difference, t(45) = 0.47. There is insufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis (Table 4.8). 
Hypothesis 5: PCPs who are younger than 60 years of age are more likely to support IA 
APRNs than those PCPs who are older. The mean for support of IA APRNs by PCPs younger 
than 60 years of age is 34.0 (SD 7.07). The mean for support of IA APRNs by PCPs 60 years of 
age and older is 34.9 (SD 7.02). The results of the difference in means test reported in Table 4.8 
suggest that there is no difference in the group means. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
with t(45) = - 0.40 (Table 4.8). 
Hypothesis 6: PCPs in states with less restrictive scope-of-practice laws are more likely 
to support IA APRNs than PCPs in states with more restrictive scope-of-practice laws. The 
support for IA APRNs in Arkansas, a least restrictive scope-of-practice law state, has a group 
mean of 36.1 (SD 5.87). The support of IA APRN mean for Oklahoma, a more restrictive scope-
of-practice state, is 33.4 (SD 9.23). The results of the difference in means test (Table 4.8) 
indicates no statistical difference of means (t(31) = 1.00). The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 8: PCPs whose opinions have changed to be more supportive of the ACA are 
more likely to support IA APRNs than PCPs whose opinions have changed to be less supportive 
of the ACA. Table 4.8 indicates the means for support of IA APRNs is 32.4 (SD 7.73) for PCPs 
whose support for the ACA has increased and is 36.0 (SD 8.42) for PCPs whose support for the 
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ACA has decreased. The difference of means test, t(22) = - 1.09, indicates the difference is not 
statistically significant. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected from this evidence (Table 4.8). 
Hypothesis 9: Female PCPs are more likely to support IA APRNs than male PCPs. The 
means for support of IA APRNs in Table 4.8 for females is 31.8 (SD 6.07) and for males is 34.9 
(SD 7.10). According to the difference of means test the result is not statistically significant 
(t(45) = - 1.19). There is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis (Table 4.8). 
Hypothesis 10: Non-Caucasian PCPs are more likely to support IA APRNs than 
Caucasian PCPs. The results in Table 4.8 indicate that the means for support of IA APRNs is 
34.4 (SD 6.65) for non-Caucasians and is 34.4 (SD 4.18) for Caucasians. The difference of 
means test indicates that the difference in means is not statistically significant. According to the 
t-value of t(45) = - 0.00 the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Table 4.8). 
Summary of the Chapter. 
An internet survey was administered to a sample of physicians practicing adult primary 
care in five states. The research hypotheses was accepted for three of the study’s hypotheses 
about the research question. The null hypotheses could not be rejected in 7 out of 10 hypotheses. 
This chapter presented the results of univariate analyses followed by bivariate analyses of PCP 
support for IA APRNs associated with selected independent variables. In bivariate analysis none 
of the physicians’ demographic or practice characteristics measured are statistically related to 
their support of IA APRNs. However, ideology, support for the ACA, and working with APRNs 
do suggest a significant association with PCPs opinions about IA APRNs, all in the expected 
direction. In the next chapter possible meanings of these findings is offered. 
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Chapter 5 – Summary and Discussion 
Introduction 
This study examined PCPs’ ideologies and their support for the ACA as influences on 
their opinions about APRNs practicing independently and autonomously in primary care. The 
primary care market is traditionally restricted to services provided exclusively by physicians and 
as such, physician opinions about care delivery changes may be reinforced through belief 
systems about traditional care (Weible and Sabatier, 2009). Ideology in the study sample is found 
to be related to PCP opinions about IA APRNs practicing in primary care with conservative 
PCPs less supportive. Similarly, PCP support of the ACA is also related to opinions about 
APRNs with PCPs who are less supportive also less supportive of APRNs. These findings may 
be of interest to state policy-makers as they consider IA APRNs as means of health reform in 
their jurisdictions (Gilman and Koslov, 2014; Isaacs and Jellinek, 2012).  
APRN care can fill a void in demand for healthcare services and access to primary care at 
a reasonable cost which are pressing issues for state legislatures in the physician-directed 
primary care system (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013a; Yee, Boukus, Cross, and 
Samuel, 2013). IA APRN delivered primary care, permitted through state scope-of-practice laws, 
is a preferred response to needed healthcare reform in 19 states (American Association of Nurse 
Practioners, 2014; Safriet, 2011; Yee, Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). In other jurisdictions, 
the decision to support scope-of-practice change may be perceived by PCPs as a repudiation of 
their interests and deeply-held beliefs about the role of government and/or professional 
responsibilities in care delivery (Keeter and Weisel, 2014; Weible and Sabatier, 2009). A scope-
of-practice change to permit IA APRNs may be a challenge to accomplish in some states and 
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without insight into how physicians can be convinced to support IA APRNs may not be 
successful. 
Health reform policy in the US is supposed to be about assuring the right treatment at the 
right time for a cost that patients can afford to pay (Berwick, Nolan, Whittington, 2008). 
However, the national debate surrounding how health policy can meet this challenge appears to 
have denigrated to a stalemate of opinions between payers and lobby groups about whether 
institutions or physicians should control decision-making authority at the point-of care (Deloitte, 
2015b; Gilman and Koslov, 2014; Thompson, 2013). Discussions about care delivery seemingly 
should include representation of “rank and file” PCPs to ensure their participation and leadership 
in cost containment at the point of care, including supporting IA APRN care (Gerber, Patashnik, 
Doherty, and Dowling, 2014; Heib, 2012). The implication from engaging PCPs in the APRN 
change process is that physician leadership is needed to endorse IA APRNs as part of a durable 
state-level health policy strategy (Angood and Birk, 2014; Link, Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014). The 
consequences of not considering the unique roles of all professionals in reform of the care 
delivery system may include a return to the gross inefficiencies that spawned the ACA in the first 
place (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011a; Link, Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014; National Conference 
of State Legislatures, 2011).  
Findings from the study are presented in the next section followed by a discussion of the 
study’s limitations. Possible implications of the findings are suggested next. A recommendation 
for future research is considered in the context of gaining support from physicians for IA 
APRNs. The chapter ends with a perspective on how to engage PCP stakeholders in decisions 
about IA APRN health reform at the point-of-care.  
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Findings 
The findings provide a perspective on the antagonistic nature of heath policy in 
conservative-majority jurisdictions or policy sub-systems (Weible and Sabatier, 2009). Liberal-
leaning PCPs have a tendency to support IA APRNS (Table 4.7) that shows their conservative-
leaning counterparts are more likely to oppose them in the face of evidence (Cassidy, 2012; 
Conover and Richards, 2015; Liu, Finkelstein, and Poghosyan, 2014; Oliver, Pennington and 
Reville, 2014; Tillett, 2011). Similarly, PCPs who support the ACA are more likely to have 
favorable opinions of IA APRNs while those PCPs who are less supportive of the ACA are less 
likely to have positive opinions about IA APRNs (Table 4.7). PCPs who work with APRNs three 
or more times per week are also more likely to express positive opinions about IA APRNs than 
PCPs who do not (Table 4.7). These three factors were found to show significant differences 
between the tests groups measuring PCPs’ generalized opinions about APRNs. Individual PCP 
characteristics including age, years in practice, race, non-clinical role in the practice, and gender 
are not related to PCP opinions about APRNs (Table 4.8).  
The findings are similar to those from previous studies that examine the influences of 
ideology on opinions, attitudes, and/or behaviors (Antiel et al., 2014; Dimock, Kiley, Keeter, and 
Doherty, 2014; Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009; Schlager, 1995). Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and 
Sulloway (2003, p. 339) suggest that “… conservatism stresses resistance to change and 
justification of inequality …” for the sake of conservativism. Dimock, Kiley, Keeter, and 
Doherty (2014, p 7) similarly suggest that conservatives who are steadfast in their opinions tend 
to be “… critics of the government and the social safety net …” which might add some credence 
to the study sample’s less supportive nature for IA APRNs by conservatives. Keeter and Weisel 
(2014, p. 6) suggest that conservatives, more so than liberals, are likely to exhibit highly 
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polarized views simply due to an issue’s support by groups in opposition to the conservative 
perspective/viewpoint.  
Considering PCPs’ support of the ACA and PCPs’ ideology may be important 
distinctions for state policy-makers looking to gain clinician, public, and legislator support for IA 
APRN policy programs and regulations. This suggestion is not unreasonable in light of cost and 
spending goals related to national health policy. Reform strategies that are focused on costs over 
physicians’ clinical decisions challenge traditional clinical roles in the performance of day-to-
day patient care delivery and services consumption (Gruber, 2011b; Gruen, Campbell, and 
Blumenthal, 2006; Office of the President, 2013).  
Ideology is a personal characteristic representative of deep-core beliefs that are difficult 
to change because of the role of pre-existing beliefs to “simplify the world” for individuals 
(Weible and Sabatier, 2009, p. 196). Ideology also appears to be very much linked with group 
identification, peer, policy, and political affiliation among others, which have been shown to be 
influenced by opinions and attitudes especially as they are in contrast to groups with opposing 
viewpoints (Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin, 2013; Merelman, 1969; Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom, 
2010; Weible, Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012). There is evidence in the literature to 
suggest that physicians’ opinions about the ACA should be considerations when determining the 
incentives and/or disincentives related to IA APRN policy to assure an orderly transition of the 
traditional care system to include IA APRN care (Angood and Birk, 2014; Federico, 2009; Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway, 2003; Matthews and Brown, 2013; Weible and Sabatier, 
2009).  
Factors influencing physicians’ opinions and interests are, at minimum, also likely 
associated with care delivery issues motivating the need for reform such as cost and induced 
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demand. The interests of physicians typically include a balanced workload based on their clinical 
judgement, fair compensation for services provided, autonomous decision authority, and 
independent practice environment among others (Deloitte, 2015; Friedberg, et al., 2015; Gruber, 
2011a; Merritt Hawkins, 2014). Public interests related to IA APRNs include access to care for 
newly insureds under the ACA, low out-of-pocket payments for patients, lower rates of 
reimbursements for state budgets, job creation, support of state and community programs 
through tax revenues they create, and payments for services based on care outcomes rather than 
fee-for-service transactions among others (Friedberg, et al., 2015; Gilman and Koslov, 2014; 
Gruber, 2011a; National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011). With a predicted increase in 
demand and combined cost increases through the foreseeable future, it is not unreasonable for 
state policy-makers to focus on cost containment over issues of access and demand in care 
delivery and miss the opportunity to improve the root cause of their escalating healthcare 
expenditures (National Association of State Legislatures, 2011; 30 Million New Patients, 2013).  
The current study brought together previously independent insights, motivations, and/or 
influences from other studies on physician opinions and APRNs and, addressed a gap in 
research. The gap is the relationship of ideology and support for the ACA as influences that 
manifest PCPs’ opinions about IA APRNs (Table 4.7). It follows from these findings that PCP 
ideology and support of reform may be the result of deeply-held beliefs about the benefits of 
traditional care delivery that does not include IA APRNs, even in the face of objective evidence 
to the contrary (Cassidy, 2012; Conover and Richards, 2015; Liu, Finkelstein, and Poghosyan, 
2014; Oliver, Pennington and Reville, 2014; Tillett, 2011). Knowing these influences, state 
policy-makers may be served by involving rank and file PCPs collaboratively about IA APRN 
policy. Engaging PCPs throughout the policy process as practice reform is considered may be a 
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beneficial strategy in meeting care delivery goals of state policy rather than asymmetrically 
constraining their profession with legislation that potentially affronts physician self-interests and 
beliefs (Berwick, 2013; Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; Gerber, Patashnik, Doherty, and 
Dowling, 2014; Heib, 2012 Ostrom, 2005; Sabatier, 1986; Weible and Sabatier, 2009). 
Implications 
Ideology and support for the ACA are found to be related to PCPs’ opinions about IA 
APRNs (Table 4.7). These influences on PCP opinions about IA APRNs may help to explain 
why some PCPs support changes to scope-of-practice laws to expand care delivery services in 
primary care with IA APRN providers while others do not. More to the point of the study, 
ideology and support of the ACA may be aligned with particularly salient underlying core beliefs 
that may distort PCPs’ opinions about IA APRNs (Jost, 2006). Examples of core beliefs include, 
but are not limited to: individual views on the role of government, beliefs about human nature, 
priorities regarding who should participate in government, the way business should be 
conducted, the role of central government, and the importance of the regulatory environment 
among others (Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers, 2008).  
PCPs’ endorsement of scope-of-practice changes is needed by state policy-makers to 
assure the public and legislators alike that the transition from traditional physician care services 
is reasonable to meet health policy needs in their jurisdictions (Gerber, Patashnik, Doherty, and 
Dowling (2014). The health policy imperative for state policy-makers is to control the projected 
growth in demand and costs for services as a consequence of “insurance for everyone” 
provisions of the ACA and an aging high service demand population (National Association of 
State Legislatures, 2013a; Naylor and Kurtzman, 2010; Safriet, 2011). These objectives can be 
achieved through IA APRN policy if there is sufficient physician leadership to support a change 
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in the status quo of care delivery (Angood, 2014). An understanding of the influences on PCP 
opinions about IA APRNs can be used by state policy-makers to encourage acceptance of IA 
APRN reform in the primary care system (May, 1992). Addressing core beliefs as heuristics in 
opinion formation with physicians may be necessary, although likely not sufficient, for state 
policy-makers to effect change in the traditional care delivery system to allow IA APRNs to 
practice primary care (May, 1992; Sabatier, 1988; Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers, 2008). There is 
also a suggestion that in some situations core beliefs may be modifiable through opportunities to 
present related scientific evidence with a policy-learning approach illustrating potential policy 
improvement impacts (May, 1992; McGinnis, 2013; Sabatier 1988; Weible, Heikkila, deLeon, 
and Sabatier, 2012).  
Core beliefs as basic constructs of PCP opinions may need to be modified in the context 
of IA APRN policy. Given the historical roots of care delivery (Agnew, 1890; Stone, 1993, 
1997; Warrington, 1839; Wildavsky, 1997), concepts of governance including one or more forms 
of federalism, such as downward, upward, fractious, fiscal, catalytic, and dynamic among other 
forms, may exacerbate attempts to change physician beliefs (Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013; 
Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). Federalism in its 
various forms relates to the sharing of authority for the public good between central government 
and states. As such, federalism may affirm physicians’ deeply-held beliefs in the face of 
mandated and/or optional policy that is handed down to states through national legislation 
(Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013, p. 4; Thompson, 2013; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014, p. 2). This 
sort of policy interaction between states and the federal government is often referred to as 
“downward federalism” when policy is used to stimulate state actions on national policy 
(Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013, p. 4; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). Often, downward federalism 
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may be perceived as a partisan “take-it-or-leave-it” action in state jurisdictions, perhaps more or 
less so when ideological differences exist between state and federal partisanship (Calaghan and 
Jacobs, 2013, p. 1).  
Physician stakeholders may form defensive opinions and attitudes about policy through 
their core beliefs especially if the federal partisan ideology is different from that of the state 
and/or the individual (Federico, 2009). The current liberal-leaning federal administration may be 
a confounding factor for state policy-makers’ attempting to influence physicians’ opinions about 
IA APRNs (Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin, 2013; Ripberger, Song, Nowlin, Jones, Jenkins-Smith, 
2012; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). There has been a tendency in the Obama administration 
to use its administrative authority to bypass the U.S. Legislature when regulating care delivery 
under the ACA which is a contentions form of “downward federalism” to many conservative 
leaning stakeholders (Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). Whether the policy handed-down to 
states is optional, such as with IA APRNs, or mandated, such as with the use of CPT6 and ICD 
coding to receive reimbursement, it is not unreasonable to project the perception by rank and file 
physicians in some jurisdictions that supporting IA APRNs is an endorsement of federal 
intrusion in local care delivery issues (Clark, 2013; Conover and Feldman, 1981).  
State bureaucracies, including state medical boards which are staffed mostly by 
physicians through states’ political appointments, may logically seem to be representative of 
PCPs’ interests and should mediate concerns, but, in reality those entities have been shown to 
represent the interests of the states’ political environment more so than the interests of rank and 
                                                 
6 CPT and ICD codes identify procedures, services, and intensity of care. The use of CPT 
and ICD code are required on claims for any healthcare reimbursement from the Federal 
government and private payers. CPT codes are owned by the AMA and ICD codes are owned by 
the World Health Organization (WHO). The AMA licenses distribution rights for the information 
content of ICD coding in the US from WHO.  
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file physicians in some jurisdictions (Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013, p. 7; Federation of State 
Medical Boards, 2005). Calaghan and Jacobs (2013, p. 8) suggest that a better predictor of 
stakeholder acquiesce to policy adoption/legitimization at the state level is through 
“…longstanding experiences with the federal government” which is a form of policy learning. 
Policy learning is a type of education approach where intergovernmental interactions as one 
element increase knowledge about benefits of particular policy (Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013; 
May, 1992).  
In states that are politically polarized with the federal government around a specific 
policy or policy component, there may not be adequate engagement or interest on behalf of state 
resources, including relevant stakeholders, to influence or be influenced in the adoption of 
federal policy (Berwick, 2013; Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). 
Such a situation may be at least some of the reason, but not all that many conservative states did 
not engage in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion programs, which like IA APRN policy is an 
optional component of the ACA (Thompson, 2012; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). As stated 
earlier, ideological stimulated indifference toward federal policy adoption/legitimization at the 
state level may be a missed opportunity to support health reform needs in their jurisdiction. 
Knowing some of the influences on PCPs’ opinions may enable state policy-makers charged 
with legitimizing federal policy in their jurisdiction to effectively engage legislators, the public, 
and rank and file physicians in support of IA APRNs.  
State policy-makers who consider the findings of this study as factors to be addressed 
during health policy adoption actions may be able to identify policy instruments, incentives or 
disincentives, to assure physician participation in meeting public interests over self-interest 
(Ostrom, 1990). Physician self-interest is associated with ideology as a core belief for 
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conservative physicians (Federico, 2009; Hardin, 1965). Core beliefs may be steadfastly 
reinforced when the corpus of those deeply-held beliefs are challenged (Gruen, Campbell, and 
Blumenthal, 2006; Keeter and Weisel, 2014; Ostrom, 2005; Weible, Hiekkila, deLeon, and 
Sabatier, 2012). Merelman’s (1969) suggestion that cognitive factors related to ideology assist in 
the development of partisanship through a process of political socialization is in line with this 
reasoning. Jost (2006) posited a similar argument that ideology is related to the maintenance of 
status quo contexts which may be the case suggested by physicians’ unwillingness to support IA 
APRNs in the face of evidence that indicates: 1) lower cost of care delivery than physicians for 
equivalent services, 2) increased access to care services, 3) jobs creation, and 4) equivalent 
quality of care with physician care (Cassidy, 2012; Institute of Medicine, 2011; National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2011; Wiysonge and Chopra, 200). Federico (2009) also 
suggested that ideology is a defining factor in opinion and belief formation and maintenance of 
core beliefs which in the case of physician self-interest include: 1) sole decision-making 
authority for care services, 2) ability to be “fairly” reimbursed for services, and, 3) discretion to 
choose which patients they treat (Accenture, 2012; Deloitte, 2015a; Jackson & Coker, 2013; 
Zismer, 2011).  
What may be unclear to state policy-makers with respect to IA APRN policy is the 
benefit to PCPs or advantage(s) to be gained by physician practices from IA APRNs. A study by 
Antiel, et al. (2014) suggested that if physicians are unable to directly see benefits to them from 
policy they are less likely to support it. PCPs who oppose the ACA might be disposed to oppose 
APRN policy because PCP endorsement of IA APRN is part and parcel of un-realized gains to 
physicians through that policy or perhaps part of spillover effects from their opposition to the 
larger Act (Zismer, 2013). State policy-makers may be challenged when seeking physician buy-
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in for reform intended to ease fiscal issues through IA APRN policy that is not 
viewed/understood to directly benefit physician self-interest (Wilensky, 2012).  
Policy-makers could be enlightened and successful in their efforts by considering IA 
APRN policy adoption strategies based on “policy learning” or education/information exchange 
for physician and legislator stakeholders to “… understand the adequacy of government 
decisions” in a reformed care delivery system (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133). Policy-learning can be 
used as a means of understanding the dynamics of integrating stakeholder beliefs with health 
policy’s goals and objectives in the context of expected changes to the care delivery status quo 
(Weible, Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012). The expected outcome from policy-learning 
should be a commitment by stakeholders to engage in the policy process while simultaneously 
determining stakeholder needs that can be integrated into a plan for policy adoption and/or 
implementation. Policy-learning actions with relevant data become part of the knowledge base 
policy-makers use when implementing other health policy features (May, 1992; Weible, 
Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012). 
Policy adoption at the state level after handoff from central authorities is accomplished 
much in the way that agenda-setting occurred at the national level (Thompson, 2013; Thompson 
and Gusmano, 2014). Interested parties, lobbyists, federal agencies, and the public express their 
preferences for the policy to legislators in the case of funding or regulatory requirements or 
directly to bureaucracies/agencies in the case of previously legislated authority (Weible and 
Sabatier, 2009). Agencies and bureaucracies, such as State Medical Boards, interact horizontally 
with other bureaucracies in their jurisdiction to gain support or opposition for the policy in 
question from other relevant state agencies and/or bureaucracies. Typically, too, they may 
interact with other states’ agencies and bureaucracies and relevant federal entities to gain further 
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insights into the value/meaning of the policy including economic and political considerations 
(Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013). To reiterate, state entities often gauge their support or opposition 
to specific policy based on prior interactions with central authorities and/or other states (Berry, 
1994; Berry and Berry, 2007). 
Policy-learning “implies improved understanding, as reflected by an ability to draw 
lessons about policy problems, objectives, or interventions” (May, 1992, p. 333). The outcome of 
such efforts is to change physician stakeholders, the public, and legislators’ perception of and 
opinions about IA APRNs delivering primary care in their jurisdiction. A common feature of 
such policy-learning efforts is to assist physician stakeholders in understanding the consequences 
of not supporting IA APRNs as well as the benefits of collaborative care, leveraged efficiencies 
in the care delivery system, and shared patient care with APRNs (Link, Perry, and Cesarotti, 
2014; May, 1992; Sabatier, 1988). The bottom-line gain for states through policy learning comes 
from social benefits that are expected to accrue through re-positioning IA APRNs in terms of the 
health policy needs of the state and the self-interests of PCPs. State needs that may be addressed 
through IA APRN policy include: 1) lower gross reimbursements for care, 2) increased access to 
services by enlarging the primary care provider pool, 3) increased and appropriate utilization of 
care delivery resources, and 4) decreases in state payments for un-compensated care (Berwick, 
Nolan, and Whittington, 2008; Mathews and Brown, 2013; Oliver, Pennington, and Reville, 
2015; Safriet, 2011).  
May (1992) suggests that policy-learning is useful in increasing the understanding of 
policy objectives and re-framing/changing goals and objectives as needed to meet un-met policy 
needs. The goal of policy-learning in the current context is to change and/or modify PCP 
opinions about IA APRNs as primary care practitioners. The findings from this study suggest 
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that PCP support of the ACA and their ideological leaning might be considerations for engaging 
in policy-learning. Ultimately a collaborative approach, possibly enabled through policy-
learning, between rank and file physicians and state policy-makers is more likely to increase the 
odds of changing scope-of-practice laws to permit IA APRNs (May, 1992; Sabatier, 1988; 
Weible, Heikkila, deLeon and Sabatier, 2012). However, those gains will likely not occur, or 
occur sub-optimally, if physician stakeholders perceive they must endure the policy change 
rather than participate in a mutually beneficial outcomes from IA APRN policy (May, 1992; 
Sabatier, 1988). 
Study Limitations 
This study and analysis face several limitations that may challenge the generalizability of 
the findings to PCPs outside of the sample. Due to a low response rate, the results may not 
extend to populations of PCPs in other states with restrictive APRN scope-of-practice 
(Templeton, Deehan, Taylor, Drummond, Strang, 1997). A possible non-response bias may be 
the result of respondents’ self-selection into the study as members of an expert panel.7  
Ideally, the study sample would include a broader distribution of respondents by gender, 
age, years in practice, and management role in their practice organization. The independent 
variables could have included additional PCP self-interest factors, such as business operations 
and administrative considerations, to potentially expand relationships with the dependent 
variable. A greater depth of understanding might be gained by integrating practice performance 
data such as the range of services reimbursed. 
                                                 
7 Physicians who self-selected into this expert panel are PCPs who represent a range of 
viewpoints on timely reform issues including managed care, care innovation, and technology 
usage among others that are desired by marketing firms for evaluation of products, services, and 
marketing messages. 
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There may be sampling bias in the selection of regionally contiguous states from which 
the PCP samples were drawn. While the choice of states was deliberate, the logic of regional 
similarity may also limit the representativeness to PCPs in other states and regions (Berry and 
Berry, 2007).8 The five states from which the study sample was selected are all politically 
conservative and as such findings may be sample specific. All of the study states’ governing 
structure is bi-cameral with Republican control of state government including state senate, house 
of representatives, and governor. The respondents were mostly conservative, 46% compared to 
25% liberal which may limit the applicability of findings to populations with different 
ideological compositions (Table 4.4). In future studies it may be useful to sample respondents 
without the constraint of regional connections. 
An additional limitation of this study is that the method of deploying the survey 
instrument does not consider those PCPs who may not use personal technology communications 
such as email or smart phones and may in fact under-represent important physician groupings by 
age (Templeton, Deehan, Taylor, Drummond, Strang, 1997). However, this potential bias may be 
minimized somewhat due to the ubiquity of the internet permitting response to the survey at any 
convenient time using several types of devices (Dillman, Smyth, and Christian, 2014). The PCP 
sample itself is a self-selected expert panel who by virtue of their collective expertise may not be 
representative of the general population of adult practice PCPs.  
The definition of primary care physician (PCP) used in the study may limit comparison of 
the results with studies that use a PCP classification by a different authority such as American 
Academy of Family Physicians (American Academy of Family Physicians, 2014). The definition 
                                                 
8 PCPs in the sample may be influenced by local and/or regional factors such as patient 
population distributions, political affiliation, and allocated budgeting for primary care that were 
not specifically identified in the study. 
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of PCPs used in the study was based on self-reported sub-specialty typically representative of 
PCPs rather than a distinct self-report of primary care specialty. There are no uniform standards 
of definitions of primary care or primary care physicians. The sample of PCPs in this study was 
derived from physicians classified by their sub-specialty which were then assembled into the 
sample of adult PCPs. While an attempt was made to distinctly identify the desired sub-
population of adult PCPs, physicians by licensure and regulation are not restricted from 
providing any type of sub-specialty services (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012). Adult 
PCPs identified in this study may in fact provide services through excluded sub-specialties or 
other populations of patients.  
Recommendations for Future Study 
If indeed, scientific evidence may be useful through policy-learning as new/additional 
information to modify PCPs’ core beliefs, then, evidence that addresses benefits, gains, and risk 
of economic loss to PCPs may be helpful in states’ efforts to adopt IA APRN policy (May, 1992; 
Weible, Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012). It would be interesting to perform a historical 
analysis of PCP reimbursement transactions to determine the scope of revenue and 
reimbursement costs that would be lost and gained in PCPs’ practice as a result of IA APRNs. 
There are many APRN cost effectiveness studies (Institute of Medicine, 2011; Liu, Finkelstein, 
and Poghosyan, 2014; Safriet, 2011) from a service-level comparison basis as opposed to 
directly evaluating changes in practice economics. No studies were found that look specifically 
at the potential or actual reimbursement impact on primary care practice when shifting 
transactions from physicians to IA APRNs. As PCPs shift low(er) intensity services from their 
practices to lower cost APRNs, a reasonable question for state policy-makers to ask is: what is 
the change in reimbursement outlay if PCPs provide higher intensity services more often than in 
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the past? The reality of healthcare is that it is unlikely that a physician practice will see any fewer 
patients per day and more likely is that their patient mix will include more patients with more 
complex needs which are reimbursed at higher rates. Also, as more patients enter the primary 
care system and have access to services with IA APRNs there is necessarily an increase in 
reimbursement transactions through increased frequency of care.  
Such a study would look at paid service codes and intensity of service delivered in the 
status quo policy arena. The services and the amount of reimbursement that could be shifted to 
APRNs from PCPs under an APRN scope-of-practice change would suggest the frequency of 
new opportunities PCPs gain to treat more complex patients. As PCPs are able to more 
consistently practice near the top of their license and reimbursement is paid for higher intensity 
services, the paid reimbursement costs may increase to even greater amounts than before changes 
to scope-of-practice laws. This analysis might also serve to illustrate potential shared business 
and care models between physicians and IA APRNs in non-traditional care arenas such as retail 
care, telemetry-based care, and continuous monitoring of chronic conditions. One cost that will 
certainly be additive with scope-of-practice changes is the cost for claiming reimbursement or 
“billing and insurance related” costs which in 2012 was approximately 13% of physicians’ 
practice revenue (Jiwani, Himmelstein, Woolhandler, and Kahn, 2014, p. 2).  
There are a number of direct and indirect consequences that exist for states in choosing to 
adopt and implement specific portions of the Affordable Care Act. The IA APRN issue is one 
with consequences that will ripple through the care delivery continuum if non-physicians are 
authorized to provide primary care service. For instance, the legislative cost perspective is 
related to cost containment, access to care, and reduced rates of spending (National Conference 
of State Legislatures, 2011). The clinical perspective in primary care is related to doing what is 
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necessary to determine the best course of treatment for a patient (American Academy of Family 
Physicians, 2014; Weed and Weed, 1999). By increasing the number of providers in the primary 
care system through the authorization of IA APRNs, the number of transactions will necessarily 
increase as will the costs of those transactions (30 Million New Patients, 2013). States that rely 
strictly on cost perspectives as rationale to change state scope-of-practice laws may be 
disappointed when failing to achieve cost controls in addition to improving access during a fiscal 
budget cycle.  
Summary and Conclusions 
APRN primary care services in states allowing IA APRN practice have demonstrated 
value to consumers and payers through increased patient access to timely and appropriate 
primary care services with cost savings over physician directed care (Conover and Richards, 
2015; Oliver, Pennington, Revelle, and Rantz, 2014). Not all physicians support changing scope-
of-practice laws to permit IA APRNs in primary care and consequently their states are often 
reluctant to proceed with that change (American Association of Nurse Practioners, 2014; Safriet, 
2011; Yee, Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). PCPs’ opinions about APRNs in subordinate 
roles are shown to be generally positive (Table 4.1). PCPs that do not support IA APRNs may be 
motivated by perceived threats to their economic status and/or independent practice autonomy 
which is linked with conservative ideology and lack of support for the ACA (Jackson Coker, 
2013; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway, 2003).  
One problem connected with PCP opinions about APRNs and states endorsing scope-of-
practice changes is related to physician collective choice. Physician collective choice is 
essentially the choices an individual physician makes between self-interest, collective interest 
(shared self-interests), and public interests (Ostrom, 1990). In the physician collective, there is 
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relative impunity for the decisions that are made. A decision that benefits the individual or the 
collective over public interests may have little negative impact on PCPs individually or as a 
group, except perhaps that the status quo is maintained. Simply, some physicians may not easily 
be motivated to support IA APRNs, perhaps because they are not aware of risks and benefits or 
as a reaction to beliefs that are inconsistent with their own core beliefs. 
May (1992) states that policy-learning is able to accomplish several objectives related to 
policy issues. May’s (1992, p. 333-335) research suggests: 1) “Learning implies improved 
understanding, as reflected by an ability to draw lessons about policy problems, objectives, or 
interventions,” 2) “Learning can entail new or reaffirmed understanding of policy problems or 
objectives” and, 3) “Learning can also be about the political feasibility of a given idea or 
prospects for advancing a given problem.” This implies that policy-learning as tool for policy-
makers could be employed in some circumstances to reframe or change stakeholder expectations 
such as with IA APRN policy goals and addressing physician self-interests. The policy-learning 
process might also include an attempt to shift PCPs perception of IA APRN policy to one that is 
consistent with ideological beliefs of physician stakeholders. This might be accomplished by 
addressing arguments associated with ideology and PCP support of the ACA as a benefit and 
physician gain rather than one that is strictly public benefit. 
The findings suggest that PCP ideology, PCP support of the ACA, and their related core 
beliefs may be instrumental in shaping and supporting their opinions about IA APRNs (Sabatier, 
1988). While core beliefs are fairly resistant to change, they and other related beliefs may be 
subject to change though new information. State policy-makers might engage physician 
stakeholders through policy-learning approaches intended to provide new information related to 
supporting IA APRNs and needed changes to scope-of-practice laws (Weible and Sabatier, 
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2009). Part of the physician policy-learning process might include elucidation of opinions 
counter to their own including those that are adversarial.  
Collective action problems in healthcare can be solved if and when appropriate policy 
solutions are presented in ways that meet, or at least address, the self-interest needs of key 
stakeholders (Ostrom, 1990). Gaining physician stakeholder support for IA APRN policy 
through a better understanding of the influences on physicians’ self-interests is a meaningful 
reason why the influences of ideology and support for the ACA on PCP opinions about IA 
APRNs should be studied (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013). It is important for national 
health policy that its state jurisdictions understand collective actions about reform of the 
traditional healthcare system. As healthcare spending approaches 25% of US gross domestic 
product (GDP) the differences between policy-mediated physician takeaways and public benefit 
must be adequately balanced (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013, p. 1). In the current policy 
environment, as long as appropriators of community health resources can operate collectively to 
circumvent potentially beneficially health policy solutions, the negative consequences of those 
actions will continue to compound to the detriment of patients and payers alike. 
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Appendix C 
Survey Instrument 
Survey Instrument: PCP Opinions on Health Policy - April 2015 
 
Q1 Required Information About my study: PCP Opinions on Health Policy - 2015" 
My name is Michael Flanigan and I am a PhD candidate in Public Policy at the University of 
Arkansas Fayetteville. I am requesting your assistance in completing a survey entitled PCP 
Opinions on Health Policy – 2015 as part of my dissertation research. 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to survey Primary Care Physicians' (PCP) opinions on 
health policy and legislated changes to the traditional care delivery system in Alabama, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma. 
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: There are no risks or benefits to you by participating in 
this study. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. This study will ask questions about health policy, 
including politics, nurse practitioners, current policy, and the Affordable Care Act of 2010. In the 
unlikely event that any of these questions make you uncomfortable, please skip that question 
and continue with the survey. You can also quit the survey at any time. 
Confidentiality: No identifying information about you personally or your medical practice is 
collected in this survey. Research records will be stored securely, and all records will be kept 
confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy. Your responses to the survey 
questions will only be used in conjunction with other responses in this survey. 
Contacts, Concerns, Complaints, and Questions:  
Principal Investigator: J Michael Flanigan, MA, MPH 
Research Advisors: Dr. Brinck Kerr 
                                Dr. Barbara Shadden 
Institutional Research Board: IRB@Uark.Edu 
By completing and submitting this questionnaire, you are agreeing to participate in this study. 
Click “Next” to begin. 
 
Q2 Which of the following best described your opinion of the ACA when it was passed in 2010. 
 I opposed the ACA in 2010 
 I supported the ACA in 2010 
 I was neutral on the ACA in 2010 
 
Q3 How supportive of the ACA are you currently compared to where you were in 2010? 
 Less supportive 
 About the same 
 More supportive 
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Q4 Which statement best describes your opinion about the ACA? 
 The ACA should be repealed in its entirety 
 Some portions of the ACA should be repealed 
 The ACA should stand as it was enacted 
 
Q5 Employing a nurse practitioner to provide primary care increases a physician's chance of 
being sued for malpractice more than hiring a staff nurse. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q6 Hiring a nurse practitioner can attract new patients to a practice. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q7 Use of a low-cost nurse practitioner is unfair to other physicians in the area. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q8 Patients are willing to see a nurse practitioner for some of their primary care. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q9 Nurse Practitioners bring a different yet positive dimension of care to a physician's practice. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
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Q10 Nurse Practitioners should be allowed to practice independently in under-served areas. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q11 Nurse Practitioners can provide 80% or more of the primary care services of a physician. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q12 Nurse Practitioners should be allowed to prescribe commonly used drugs. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q13 Nurse Practitioners are not needed to improve access to primary care services in rural 
areas. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q14 Nurse Practitioners provide lower quality primary care than physicians. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q15 Employing a nurse practitioner would increase a physician's time for activities other than 
patient care. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
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Q16 Nurse Practitioners are practical as physician extenders when immediate supervision is 
provided by a physician. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q17 In the last year I volunteered to assist in a national, state, and/or local candidate's election 
campaign. 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q18 In the last year, I contributed money to a national, state, and/or local candidate, political 
group, or political party. 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q19 From an ideology perspective, I view myself as .....   
 Consistently Conservative 
 Mostly Conservative 
 Moderate 
 Mostly Liberal 
 Consistently Liberal 
 
Q20 I understand the major provisions of the ACA. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q21 The ACA will address many of the problems in the current healthcare system. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
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Q22 In the next 3-5 years, capitation payments will replace fee-for-service payments. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q23 In the next 3-5 years, most primary care services will be delivered through hospital 
systems. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q24 The use of "direct to physician" remote care services should be expanded. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q25 Retail clinics should be allowed to provide chronic care management services after a 
physician has provided a diagnosis. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q26 Since the ACA was implemented; my practice has stopped accepting new patients with 
Medicare and Medicaid insurance.  
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
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Q27 As a result of the ACA, it is necessary to practice defensive medicine. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q28 The US Healthcare System under fee-for-service is flawed and under-performing. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q29 Successful cost containment will occur when patients fully comply with their treatment 
plans. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q30 Select your current age in years from the selections below. (Choose one please) 
 age 35 and younger 
 age 36-45 
 age 46-54 
 age 55-59 
 age 60 and older 
 
Q31 What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Q32 Would you describe yourself as ..... (Choose one please) 
 American Indian/Native American 
 Asian 
 Black\African American 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 White/Caucasian 
 Pacific Islander 
 Other 
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Q33 What type of medicine do you primarily practice? (Choose one please) 
 Family Practice 
 General Medicine 
 Internal Medicine 
 Geriatrics 
 Other 
 
Q34 How long have you been practicing medicine post-residency? 
 1-5 years in practice 
 6-10 years in practice 
 11-15 years in practice 
 16-20 years in practice 
 More than 20 years in practice 
 
Q35 How many years until you STOP practicing medicine? 
 1-5 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis 
 6-10 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis 
 10-15 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis 
 16-20 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis 
 More than 20 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis 
 
Q36 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President? 
 Strongly Disapprove 
 Disapprove 
 Neither Approve or Disapprove 
 Approve 
 Strongly Approve 
 
Q37 All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country 
today? 
 Strongly Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Neither Satisfied or Dissatisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Strongly Satisfied 
 
Q38 Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good  
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
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Q39 Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q40 Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q41 Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing 
anything in return. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q42 Scope of practice laws in my state should be changed to allow independent autonomous 
practice by nurse practitioners. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
Q43 In which state do you most often practice medicine? 
 Alabama 
 Arkansas 
 Louisiana 
 Mississippi 
 Oklahoma 
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Q44 What is your place in the business structure of your practice? 
 Sole Proprietor or Owner 
 Partner or PA 
 Employee 
 Contractor or locum tenens 
 Other 
If Employee Is Selected, Then Skip To On average, do you work with Nurse Pr...If Other Is 
Selected, Then Skip To On average, do you work with Nurse Pr...If Contractor or locum tenens 
Is Selected, Then Skip To On average, do you work with Nurse Pr... 
 
Q45 Does your practice employ Nurse Practitioners? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't know 
 
Q46 On average, do you work with Nurse Practitioners at least three (3) or more days per 
week? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't know 
 
 
